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“Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so 
firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to 
a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care.”  Dimick v. Schiedt, 239 U.S. 474, 
486 (1935).   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate fraud and greed led to the downfall of two major multinational 
corporations, Enron and WorldCom, in the early part of the twenty-first century.1 The 
corporate scandals caught the attention of the general public, corporations, Wall Street, 
and Congress like few scandals ever have.2 The primary victims of the scandals—
company employees, investors, and pensioners—suffered greatly from the companies’ 
deceptive practices and ultimate collapses.3 The investigations into the debacles revealed 
that certain employees in these companies had identified the fraudulent practices that 
ultimately led to their destruction.4 Yet, these employees were discouraged from 
reporting the practices due to a lack of legal protection for whistleblowers.5 The few 
corporate insiders who risked their careers in an attempt to correct the fraudulent 
practices, Cynthia Cooper and Sherron Watkins, were hailed as heroes by Time Magazine 
in 2002.6 Congress, recognizing the outcry from the general public, acted swiftly to 
provide comprehensive federal protection for corporate employees who report corporate 
fraud by enacting the Public Company Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, 
commonly known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.7 On July 30, 2002, President Bush 
signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act into law.8 The Act aimed to destroy the “corporate code 
of silence” that was aided by the lack of comprehensive legal protection for corporate 
whistleblowers.9
The Act contains four key whistleblower-protection provisions.  First, Section 806 
of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Title VIII of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 [hereinafter SOX] contains a traditional civil anti-retaliation 
provision. Covered employers, which include publicly traded corporations, their 
contractors, subcontractors, and agents, are prohibited from retaliating against employees 
who report suspected corporate fraud or Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
violations.10 The civil protections are limited to employees of publicly traded 
 
1 STEPHEN M. KOHN, MICHAEL D. KOHN, AND DAVID K. COLAPINTO, WHISTLEBLOWER LAW: A GUIDE TO
LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR CORPORATE EMPLOYEES xi (2004).
2 See, e.g., McGarrity v. Berlin Metals, Inc., 774 N.E.2d 71, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“With the sole
exception of the war on terrorism, no issue dominates current thought more than the corporate and
accountancy ethical scandals which have rocked our country.”).
3 KOHN, supra note 1, at xii.
4 Id.
5 Id. Although a variety of federal and state laws provide protection for certain types of whistleblowers,
neither Texas state law nor federal law protected the whistleblowers of Enron and WorldCom.
6 Persons of the Year 2002, TIME, Dec. 22, 2002.
7 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
8 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 543 (July 30, 2002).
9 KOHN, supra note 1, at xiii.
10 SOX Act § 806; 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a). Section 806 of the SOX Act was originally drafted by the
Senate Judiciary Committee as Section 806 of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of
2002. KOHN, supra note 1, at 4. The corporate whistleblower provision, which the Senate Judiciary
Committee passed unanimously, was incorporated into the final version of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by way
of the Leahy-McCain Amendment. KOHN, supra note 1, at 4. The Senate adopted the amendment on July
25, 2002. See 148 Cong. Rec. S7357-58 (daily ed. July 25, 2002). Senator Patrick Leahy was the
principal sponsor of the corporate whistleblower law. KOHN, supra note 1, at 4. Section 1514A states:
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companies.11 Second, in addition to civil liability, the Act criminalizes retaliation against 
employee whistleblowers.  Under the amended obstruction of justice statute, any person 
who “knowingly, with the intent to retaliate, takes any action harmful to any person, 
including interference with the lawful employment or livelihood of any person, for 
providing to a law enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the 
commission or possible commission of any Federal offense” is subject to a fine and/or 
imprisonment.12 Third, retaliation against corporate whistleblowers who complain to 
auditing committees concerning questionable accounting practices is prohibited.13
Finally, attorneys who practice before the Securities and Exchange Commission are now 
mandatory whistleblowers.14
The heart of the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protection provisions is the anti-
retaliation provision contained in Section 806 of the Act.  Section 806 adopts a two-track 
enforcement system that is unique in employment discrimination law.  The first track of 
the system is similar to the administrative procedures available under whistleblower 
provisions of other federal statutes, such as the Aviation Investment and Reform Act for 
the 21st Century, the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act, the Clean Air Act, the Energy 
Reorganization Act, the Solid Waste Disposal Act, and the Whistleblower Protection 
 
(a) Whistleblower Protection For Employees of Publicly Traded Companies.—No
company with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l), or that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)), or any officer, employee,
contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company, may discharge, demote, suspend,
threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee in the terms
and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the employee—
(1) to provide information, cause information to be provided, or otherwise assist in an
investigation regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a
violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against
shareholders, when the information or assistance is provided to or the investigation is
conducted by---
(A) a Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency;
(B) any Member of Congress or any committee of Congress; or
(C) an person with supervisory authority over the employee (or any such other person
working for the employer who has the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate
misconduct; or
(2) to file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in, or otherwise assist in a proceeding
filed or about to be filed (with any knowledge of the employer) relating to an alleged
violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against
shareholders.
11 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a); 148 Cong. Rec. S7418-01 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Senator Leahy)
(“[Section 806] would provide whistleblower protection to employees of publicly traded companies.”).
12 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e).
13 KOHN, supra note 1, at xiii.
14  Section 307 of the Act puts mandatory reporting obligations on attorneys who practice before the SEC. 
Attorneys who represent issuers must report evidence of a material breach of securities law or breach of
fiduciary duty or similar violations by the company or agent thereof to appropriate company officers,
committees, and/or the board of directors.
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Act.15 The corporate whistleblower can file an administrative complaint with the 
Occupational Safety & Health Administration.16 An OSHA investigator will investigate 
the complaint and make findings.17 Objections to the findings can be filed with the Chief 
Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Department of Labor.18 Administrative hearings are 
conducted by an Administrative Law Judge in accordance with the rules of practice and 
procedure for administrative hearings before the Office of Administrative Law Judges.19
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be appealed to the Administrative Review 
Board (acting on behalf of the Secretary of Labor).20 Judicial review of the 
Administrative Review Board’s decision is available in the appropriate federal court of 
appeals.21
Unlike the other federal whistleblower statutes, however, the SOX whistleblower 
provision has a second track. The option exists for a SOX complainant to take his or her 
case to federal court if the Secretary of Labor has not issued a final decision on the 
administrative complaint “within 180 days of the filing of the complaint and there is no 
showing that such delay is due to the bad faith of the complainant.”22 The whistleblower 
provision gives claimants in that situation the right to bring “an action at law or equity for 
de novo review” in the appropriate federal district court, no matter the amount in 
controversy.23 In short, so long as the claimant litigates the case for at least 180 days 
within the Department of Labor [hereinafter DOL] without engaging in any “bad faith” 
conduct to delay the DOL proceedings and does not receive a final ruling within the 180-
day period, the claimant can refile his or her case in federal district court.  One 
 
15 See 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (AIR 21 Act); 49 U.S.C. § 60129 (Pipeline Safety Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (Clean
Air Act); 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (ERA); 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (SWDA); 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a) (WPA).
16 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(A) (complaint filed with Secretary of the Department of Labor). The
Secretary delegated to the Assistant Secretary of OSHA the responsibility to receive and investigate SOX
complaints. Secretary’s Order, 5-2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 65008 (Oct. 22, 2002).
17 The rules and regulations concerning the SOX administrative procedure generally follow the rules and
procedures set forth in the employee protection provisions of the AIR 21 Act, which Congress enacted to
protect airline employees from retaliation by air carriers because of protected whistleblowing activities.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(A) and 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b). OSHA has promulgated regulations that
govern procedures and time frames for handling discrimination complaints under Title VIII of Sarbanes-
Oxley. See 69 Fed. Reg. 62104 (Aug. 24, 2004). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1980.103 (Filing of discrimination
complaint); § 1980.104 (Investigation); § 1980.105 (Issuance of findings and preliminary orders).
18 See 29 C.F.R. § 1980.106(a).
19 Id. at § 1980.107.
20 Id. at § 1980.110.
21 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(A) and 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(4)(A). (“Any person adversely affected or
aggrieved by a [final order issued by the Secretary of the Department of Labor] may obtain review of the
order in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the violation, with respect to which the
order was issued, allegedly occurred or the circuit in which the complainant resided on the date of such
violation.”).
22 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (“A person who alleges discharge or any other discrimination by any
person in violation of subsection (a) may seek relief under subsection (c), by . . . if the Secretary has not
issued a final decision within 180 days of the filing of the complaint and there is no showing that such
delay is due to the bad faith of the claimant, bringing an action at law or equity for de novo review in the
appropriate district court of the United States, which shall have jurisdiction over such an action without
regard to the amount in controversy.”).
23 Id.
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commentator states that Congress provided the refile right because prior claims 
administered by the DOL under other federal whistleblower laws had tended to languish 
within the DOL for years.24 The federal court escape clause allows claimants to bypass 
that particular problem.25
Although SOX provides for a private right of action to be brought in federal court 
under the above-described conditions, the statute does not explicitly state whether such 
an action can be tried to a jury.26 Senator Patrick Leahy, the principal sponsor and author 
of the SOX whistleblower provision, introduced legislative history that indicates 
Congress intended to provide the right to a jury trial.27 But the lack of an explicit 
guarantee in the statute casts doubt on whether federal courts will uniformly interpret the 
statute or the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to guarantee the right to a jury 
trial.  A federal district court in Texas has already interpreted the statute as failing to 
provide the right to a jury trial.  The Texas court concluded that the Seventh Amendment 
does not guarantee the right to a jury trial because the statutory remedies are limited to 
equitable relief.28 Other federal district courts have noted the issue as one of first 
impression, but postponed a ruling on the question.29 If the first few examples are any 
indication of what is to come, the federal courts will undoubtedly struggle with the jury-
trial issue in SOX, just as they have with other federal employment discrimination 
statutes that do not explicitly provide the right to a jury trial.30
24 KOHN, supra note 1, at 8.
25 Id. at 9.
26 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (right to bring SOX whistleblower action at law or equity for de
novo review in the appropriate district court) with 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (“If a complaining party [Title VII
plaintiff] seeks compensatory or punitive damages under this section, any party may demand a trial by
jury.”).
27 148 CONG. REC. S7420 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (“Only if there is not final agency decision within 180
days of the complaint (and such delay is not shown to be due to the bad faith of the claimant) may he or she
bring a de novo case in federal court with a jury trial available (See United States Constitution, Amendment
VII; Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
28 See Murray v. TXU Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10945, 2005 WL 135644, 86 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH), P41, 981 (N.D. Tex. June 7, 2005).
29 See Fraser v. Fiduciary Trust Co. Int’l, 417 F. Supp. 2d 310, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Hanna v. WCI
Communities, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1334 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
30 See Lorrillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978) (finding statutory right to jury trial in a private civil action
for lost wages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act even though the ADEA contains no
provision expressly granting a right to jury trial); Lebow v. American Trans Air, Inc., 86 F.3d 661 (7th Cir.
1996) (Seventh Amendment guarantees right to jury trial to employee suing his employer under the
Railway Labor Act for discharging him because of his union-related activities); Waldrop v. Southern
Company Services, Inc., 24 F.3d 152 (11th Cir. 1994) (jury trial is constitutionally required under Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act); Hill v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 934 F.2d 1518 (11th Cir. 1991) (Jury
Systems Improvement Act – jury-duty discrimination statute – provides a right to jury trial under the
Seventh Amendment); Spinelli v. Gaughan, 12 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 1993) (jury trial unavailable for
Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 510 claim); Troy v. City of Hampton, 756 F.2d 1000 (4th Cir.
1985) (no constitutional right to a jury trial in action for reinstatement and lost wages under the Veterans
Reemployment Rights Act); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir.
1969) (pre-1991 Civil Rights Act case holding that a jury trial is not required in a Title VII action for
reinstatement and backpay); cf. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (damages suit under § 812 of the
Civil Rights of 1968 is an action to enforce “legal rights” and thus Seventh Amendment preserved the
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This article addresses three interrelated questions.  Part II of the article considers 
whether the statutory language in SOX should be interpreted to imply the right to a jury 
trial, thus avoiding the Seventh Amendment question.  Assuming the statute cannot be 
interpreted to imply the right to a jury trial, Part III of the article considers whether the 
right to a jury trial on the SOX whistleblower action is guaranteed by the Seventh 
Amendment.  Part IV adds some concluding remarks.  In a nutshell, the following 
paragraph summarizes the argument.            
 Congress provided SOX whistleblowers with a private right of action that allows 
them to bring an action at law to seek legal relief in the form of backpay and special 
damages, such as mental anguish damages, as well as an action at equity to seek 
reinstatement, a clearly equitable remedy, if the 180-day DOL decision deadline is not 
met.  As a matter of statutory interpretation, the statutory structure, statutory language, 
and legislative history indicate the jury-trial right applies in situations where the relief 
sought includes backpay or non-pecuniary damages.  Judicial interpretation implying the 
right to a jury trial is sensible and avoids a direct confrontation with the Seventh 
Amendment.  If the Seventh Amendment is squarely confronted, however, the result is 
the same.  SOX whistleblowers who seek backpay and other special damages have the 
constitutional right to a trial by jury because in doing so they are seeking to enforce legal 
rights to legal relief.  Backpay under SOX is a quintessential legal remedy. As a practical 
matter, SOX whistleblower actions should routinely be tried to juries even when SOX 
plaintiffs seek reinstatement in conjunction with legal relief.31
II. THE STATUTORY QUESTION: MEANING AND INTERPRETATION 
A. The Aftermath of Ambiguity 
 Congress knows how to explicitly provide the right to a jury trial for a federal 
cause of action when it so desires.  The textbook example of an explicit statutory jury-
trial guarantee in the employment discrimination area is the 1991 Civil Rights Act 
(CRA), which amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.32 Section 102 of the 
CRA amended Title VII to provide for the recovery of compensatory and punitive 
damages in intentional discrimination cases.33 The CRA defined the term “compensatory 
damages” through inclusion and exclusion.  By way of inclusion, “compensatory 
damages” includes “future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, 
mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary losses.”34 By way of 
exclusion, “backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief authorized under 
section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964” are excluded from the realm of 
 
litigant’s right to a jury trial). See also Robert L. Strayer, II, Note, Asserting the Seventh Amendment: An
Argument for the Right to a Jury Trial When Only Back Pay is Sought Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 52 VAND. L. REV. 795 (1999) (arguing that Seventh Amendment preserves right to jury on
ADA backpay claims); Denise Drake Clemow & Lisa Hund Lattan, ERISA Section 510 Claims: No Right
to a Jury Trial Can Be Found, 73 NEB. L. REV. 756 (1994) (no constitutional right to jury trial on ERISA §
510 claims because remedies provided by Congress are only equitable).
31 See, e.g., Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
32 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
33 CRA § 102; 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1).
34 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
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“compensatory damages.”35 The CRA states that “[i]f a complaining party seeks 
compensatory or punitive damages . . . any party may demand a trial by jury.” (emphasis 
added).36
In contrast to amended Title VII, SOX contains no explicit statutory right to a jury 
trial.  SOX enables the corporate whistleblower to bring “an action at law or equity for de 
novo review” in federal district court, assuming the administrative requirement is 
satisfied.37 It also contains a remedial provision, which provides that a prevailing 
employee is entitled to all make-whole relief.38 Make-whole relief includes three 
categories of what Congress characterizes as compensatory damages:  reinstatement, 
back pay, and special damages.  The remedial provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c) states:  
REMEDIES.
(1) IN GENERAL.—An employee prevailing in any action under 
 subsection (b)(1) shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the 
 employee whole.            
 (2) COMPENSATORY DAMAGES.—Relief for any action under 
 paragraph (1) shall include—       
 (A) reinstatement with the same seniority status that the employee 
 would have had, but for the discrimination.     
 (B) the amount of back pay, with interest; and    
 (C) compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of 
 the discrimination, including litigation costs, expert witness fees, and 
 reasonable attorney fees.   
 In terms of the plain language of the statute, the characterization of the action as 
being available “at law or equity for de novo review” and the remedial provision is the 
sum of the evidence on Congressional intent.  Does the absence of a specific guarantee in 
the plain language of the statute mean that jury trials are to be denied to SOX plaintiffs?  
Not necessarily.  Ambiguity in the statute, in this instance, does not preclude an 
interpretation that implies the right to a jury trial.    
 The legal academic literature is replete with articles addressing particular 
statutory construction methodologies.39 Some articles address whether one foundational 
theory of statutory interpretation is better than another.40 This article does not stake any 
particular claim as to whether one statutory construction methodology is preferable to 
another or whether the various methodologies can be neatly separated.  However, various 
interpretive techniques will be used in addressing whether the right to a jury trial should 
 
35 Id. at § 1981a(b)(2).
36 Id. at § 1981a(c)(1).
37 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B).
38 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(1).
39 See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006); Caleb
Nelson, What is Textualism, 91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005); Stanley Fish, Symposium: What is Legal
Interpretation? There is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629 (2005); William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip F. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990).
40 Id.
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be implied.  In such a difficult interpretive puzzle as this one, the advice from Chief 
Justice Marshall is particularly apt—“where the mind labours to discover the design of 
the legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be derived.”41
B. Statutory Construction  
It is an often-stated principle that a statute should be construed to avoid raising a 
serious constitutional question, if possible.42 The SOX language, structure, legislative 
history, as well as its purpose, indicate that it is plausible that Congress intended to grant 
the right to a jury trial on SOX claims that seek legal, as opposed to equitable, relief.  
Judicial adoption of such an interpretation is favored in order to avoid the thorny 
constitutional question.43
1. Supreme Court Precedent 
 The United States Supreme Court has expressed a reluctance to imply a right to a 
jury trial when the statute itself makes no mention of jury trials or even juries for that 
matter.  In City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, the Court refused to 
construe Section 1983 to imply a right to jury trial merely because the statute authorizes a 
party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief 
through “an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”44 The 
phrase “action at law,” standing alone, does not necessarily implicate the right to a jury 
trial.45
In Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, the Court held, consistent with federal 
court of appeals decisions, that Section 504(c) of the Copyright Act cannot be interpreted 
to imply the right to a jury trial.46 Section 504(c) permits the recovery of “statutory 
damages,” which the court assesses in a just amount.47 In this context, the term “court” 
 
41 United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386 (U.S. 1805).
42 The statutory question should be considered before the constitutional question because it is a “cardinal
principle” that courts must “first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which
the constitutional question may be avoided.” City of Monterrey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S.
687, 707 (1999); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 345 (1998) (quoting Tull v.
United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417, n.3 (1987); accord Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 577. On occasion, however, the
Supreme Court has been willing to forego extended consideration of the statutory question when two
conditions are satisfied: (i) the wording and construction of the statute permit plausible arguments on both
sides of the jury-trial issue; and (ii) the necessity for jury trial is so clearly settled by prior Seventh
Amendment decisions that it would be futile to spend time on the statutory issue. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 192
and n.6.
43
“Where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful questions arise
and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.” United States ex re.
Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366 (1909). For criticism of this canon, see
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation – in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
800, 815-17 (1983).
44 City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 707-08.
45 Id.
46 Feltner, 523 U.S. at 345.
47 In pertinent part, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) provides:
STATUTORY DAMAGES – 
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meant judge, not jury.48 The Court contrasted the remedies provisions of the Copyright 
Act that use the term “court” in contexts that confer authority on the judge with Section 
504(b) of the Act.49 Section 504(b) does not use the word “court” in addressing awards 
of actual damages and profits.50 The Court stated that actual damages and profits are 
generally thought to constitute legal relief and intimated that entitlement to a jury trial 
exists for copyright actions that seek actual damages.51
In Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, the Court considered a bankruptcy case in 
which a Chapter 11 bankruptcy trustee sued various corporations to avoid allegedly 
fraudulent transfers and recover damages.52 The corporations based their claim to a jury 
trial entirely on the Seventh Amendment.53 The Court agreed with the corporations’ 
position that the 1982 version of 28 U.S.C. § 1411, a statutory provision for jury trials in 
bankruptcy proceedings, did not provide a statutory entitlement to a jury trial.54 The 
Court characterized § 1411 as “notoriously ambiguous” and noted that the confused 
legislative history of § 1411 had “puzzled commentators.”55
In Lorillard v. Pons, the Court implied the statutory right to a jury trial in private 
ADEA actions for lost wages.56 The relevant statutory language authorized individuals 
to bring actions for “legal or equitable relief” and “the court . . . to grant such legal or 
equitable relief as may be appropriate.”57 The Court’s decision rested on two factors.  
First, the statute used the term “legal relief,” which the court determined to be a “term of 
art.”58 The Seventh Amendment entitlement to a jury trial on claims for legal relief is 
historic and well-known, thus raising the inference that Congress used the term “legal” 
with the intent to provide for a jury trial.59 Second, the ADEA’s remedial provisions 
were expressly to be enforced in accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 
which had been uniformly interpreted to provide a right to a jury trial on unpaid wage 
 
(1)  Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the copyright owner may elect, at any time 
before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory 
damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work, . . . in a sum of not less 
than $500 or more than $20,000 as the court considers just . . .”   
 (2)  In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that 
infringement was committed willfully, the court [in] its discretion may increase the award of statutory 
damages to a sum of not more than $100,000.  In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, 
and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court [in] its discretion may increase the 
award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $100,000.  In a case where the infringer sustains the 
burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that 
his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of 
statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200.   




52 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
53 Id. at 40.
54 Id. at 40, n.3.
55 Id.
56 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978).
57 Id. at 583. See also 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)-(c).
58 Id. at 583.
59 Id.
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claims by private actors.60 As the Court stated, “[w]hen Congress adopts a new law 
incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had 
knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects 
the new statute.”61 The Court presumed that Congress intended the FLSA right to jury 
trial to apply in the ADEA context.62
2. SOX Statutory Structure, Statutory Language, and Legislative History 
 The statutory language in the civil action provision and the remedial provision 
should be interpreted to imply the right to a jury trial.  The civil action provision 
authorizes a SOX plaintiff to bring an “action at law . . . for de novo review.”63 The term 
“action at law” is synonymous with a jury trial.64 The term “de novo review” in this 
statute could be interpreted to mean a de novo jury trial.  The remedial provision 
authorizes the recovery of monetary damages as compensation, which constitutes legal 
relief.65 Legal relief has traditionally been associated with entitlement to a jury trial.66
a. The SOX Civil Action Provision 
 The statute authorizes a SOX plaintiff to bring an “action at law or equity for de 
novo review” in federal district court.67 City of Monterey teaches that the use of the 
phrase “action at law” does not necessarily imply the right to a jury trial, but its use in 
SOX is certainly a point to consider in determining whether to imply such a right in that 
actions at law are synonymous with jury trials.  Nonetheless, what about the fact that the 
statute authorizes an “action in equity” and calls for “de novo review”?  Equity suits are 
not tried to juries68 and it would seem at first blush that “de novo review” entails a judge 
making a decision, not a jury making a decision.    
 With regard to the statutory authorization to bring an equity action, perhaps 
Congress contemplated that some SOX plaintiffs would bring a federal court action 
seeking reinstatement as his or her only remedy, i.e., no damages, however unlikely that 
would be. In such a scenario, the action would be in equity because reinstatement is an 
equitable remedy and thus no jury right applies.69 In the typical SOX action, however, 
the plaintiff will seek reinstatement, back pay, and perhaps reputational and mental 
anguish damages, which presumably would be a SOX action at law because legal relief in 
the form of monetary damages is sought.70 Because an action at law seeking monetary 
damages is the quintessential jury claim, it would appear as though Congress intended for 
 
60 Id. at 580-81.
61 Id. at 581.
62 Id.
63 See supra note 22.
64 See infra note 101.
65 See infra note 110.
66 See infra note 110.
67 See supra note 22.
68 See infra notes 101 and 102.
69 See infra notes 101, 102, and 116.
70 See infra note 110.
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these types of claims to be tried to juries, depending on what Congress meant by the term 
“de novo review.”   
 The following subparts examine what Congress likely meant by “de novo review” 
and whether “de novo review” can be conducted by a jury.  The conclusion is that 
Congress intended for juries to hear a trial de novo if a plaintiff brings a SOX action at 
law.  
i. De novo review means de novo trial  
 De novo review is a legal term whose meaning varies with the circumstances.  
Literally, de novo means “[a]new; afresh; a second time.”71 The use of the term “de novo 
review” that immediately comes to mind is in reference to appellate review of a trial 
court’s legal decisions, such as whether the trial court’s jury instructions misstated the 
law or whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment.72 De novo review, in 
this context, does not involve the taking of additional evidence. It is not a trial de novo.
Historically, however, the term “de novo review” had its origins in equity cases, 
which appellate courts tried anew.73 In the ancient English chancery system, de novo 
review of the chancellor’s decision “took the form of a trial de novo complete with the 
taking of testimony and other evidence.”74 In this country, review in equity cases 
gradually moved from a complete trial de novo to simply appellate review of the record.75
Today, in state jurisdictions that have chancery courts, the appeal of an equity case 
generally involves the appellate court reviewing de novo the factual findings and legal 
conclusions made by the chancellor based on the record made in the chancery court.76
Some level of deference is generally given to the chancellor’s factual findings nowadays 
because oral testimony is allowed in equity trials.77 Historically, only written testimony 
was permitted in equity cases.78
Notwithstanding the watered-down version of de novo review in modern-day 
equity cases, de novo review generally entails at the very least “an independent 
 
71 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
72 See Wall Data v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Dept., 447 F.3d 769, 784 (9th Cir. 2006) (appellate court
reviews jury instructions de novo to determine instructions misstate the law); U.S. v. Darif, 446 F.3d 701,
709 (7th Cir. 2006) (same); Crigger v. Fahnestock and Co., Inc., 443 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 2006) (same);
Scaife v. Cook County, 446 F.3d 735, 738-39 (7th Cir. 2006) (appellate court reviews the district court’s
grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts and drawing all inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party).
73 See Waddill v. Anchor Hocking, Inc., 78 P.3d 570, 573 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
74 See Kelly Kunsch, Standard of Review (State and Federal): A Primer, 18 SEATTLE UNIV. L. R. 11, 16
(1994).
75 Id. at 16-18.
76 See Arkansas Presbytery v. Hudson, 40 S.W.3d 301, 305 (Ark. 2001); Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d
864, 870 (Iowa 1996).
77 See Hudson, 40 S.W.3d at 305; Kunsch, supra note 74, at 17-18.
78 See Kunsch, supra note 74, at 17-18.
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determination of the issues.” 79 In other words, deference is not paid to the previous 
entity that made a particular decision, whether the entity is a trial court or an 
administrative agency.  The more difficult question is whether the “independent 
determination” is to be based strictly on the record developed by the prior entity, or 
whether the entity engaging in the de novo review can make a determination based on 
additional evidence that is generated in the new proceeding.  The term de novo review is 
used both ways.80 Under some federal statutes and laws, de novo review does not 
involve the taking of additional evidence and is confined to the record developed 
below.81 In other federal statutes, de novo review involves the reviewing entity 
considering new or additional evidence or conducting a complete trial de novo.82 For 
SOX purposes, does “de novo review” mean independent fact-finding based solely on 
what is in the administrative record, or does “de novo review” involve a complete trial de
novo in which additional evidence that is generated in the civil action itself is considered? 
 
79 See United States v. First City Nat’l Bank of Houston, 386 U.S. 361, 368 (1967) (de novo review means
the court should make an independent determination of the issues); Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1190, 1192
(9th Cir. 1990) (“De novo review means we make an independent determination of the issues.”);
80 See 2 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW § 15.02 (3d.
ed. 1999). See also 5 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN, & J. GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 51.04 (rev. ed. 1985)
(court engaged in de novo review is not confined to the administrative record, but may pursue whatever
further inquiry it finds necessary or proper to the exercise of court’s independent judgment).
81 In an ERISA benefits denial case in which the standard of review is de novo, the district court is
confined to the administrative record that was before the Plan Administrator. See Perry v. Simplicity
Engineering, 900 F.2d 963, 966 (6th Cir. 1990). The Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B),
provides for de novo district court review of a magistrate’s recommendations on pretrial motions. The de
novo review is based on the evidentiary record before the magistrate. See United States v. Raddatz, 447
U.S. 667 (1980).
82 The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g), provides a civil action in federal district court to any individual
who desires to challenge an agency’s determination not to amend the individual’s record. “In such a case
the court shall determine the matter de novo.” Id. § 552a(g)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The “de novo”
review in the Privacy Act is not limited to or constricted by the administrative record. See Doe v. United
States of America, 821 F.2d 694, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Federal Administrative Procedures Act, 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(F), provides that a reviewing court shall “hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to
trial de novo by the reviewing court.” (emphasis added). The courts have universally interpreted this
provision as establishing a de novo review standard. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 415 (1971), the Supreme Court referred to § 706(2)(F) as providing for de novo review, but
confined the de novo review of agency actions to two circumstances. The Court stated:
De novo review of whether the Secretary’s decision was “unwarranted by the facts” is
authorized by § 706(2)(F) in only two circumstances. First, such de novo review is
authorized when the action is adjudicatory in nature and the agency factfinding
procedures are inadequate. And, there may be independent judicial factfinding when
issues that were not before the agency are raised in a proceeding to enforce non-
adjudicatory agency action.
Subsequent cases have revealed that the Overton Park decision makes it difficult to convince a court that de 
novo review is authorized under § 706(2)(F).  However, it is understood that de novo review under the APA 
permits the consideration of extrinsic evidence outside the administrative record and allows the plaintiff to 
put on his own case through new testimony and documentary evidence.  See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 
142 (U.S. 1973); FTC v. U.S. Roofing Corp., 853 F.2d 458, 461 n.5 (6th Cir. 1988); Stewart v. Potts, 126 F. 
Supp. 2d 428, 434 (S.D. Tex. 2000); La Plaza Defense League v. Kemp, 742 F. Supp. 792, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990); Cronkhite v. Kemp, 741 F. Supp. 828, 829-30 (E.D. Wash. 1990); Edward C. Fritz, Broadening 
Judicial Review Under the National Forest Management Act, 3 WISC. ENVTL. L. J. 27, 35 (1996).         
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“De novo review” in SOX means a full de novo trial, in which the finder of fact 
makes an independent determination of liability and damages based on evidence 
generated and introduced in the federal court case, for several reasons.  First, the SOX 
legislative history reveals that the use of the word “review” in the statute is not meant to 
signify that the federal-court factfinder is limited by any administrative record.  The 
legislative history states that the SOX claimant may bring a “de novo case in federal 
court with a jury trial available.”83 (emphasis added).  The key word in the history is 
“case.”  The legal definition of “case” is “a civil or criminal proceeding, action, suit, or 
controversy at law or in equity.”84 In essence, Congress used the term “de novo review” 
in federal court to say that a claimant could bring an entirely new suit in federal court.   
Nothing in statute or the legislative history indicates that this new case must be limited to 
the administrative record before the Department of Labor.  Congress did not expressly 
indicate that de novo review was to be confined to the administrative record; nor did it 
use the term “substantial evidence,” a term of art which is universally understood to mean 
review limited to the administrative record.85
Second, interpreting “de novo review” in SOX to mean “limited to the 
administrative record” makes no sense because in most SOX actions brought in federal 
district court there is little, if any, agency record to review.  In general, SOX 
complainants who choose to file suit in district court do so before the administrative law 
judge holds an administrative hearing.86 In those situations, the only relevant 
administrative document that the fact-finder could possibly “review” is an OSHA 
preliminary order.87 The OSHA investigator’s preliminary written findings are based on 
a brief, initial investigation and only go so far as to state “whether or not there is 
reasonable cause to believe that the named person has discriminated against the 
complainant in violation of the Act.”88 The OSHA preliminary findings are not made 
after a trial-court like hearing in which both parties have a fair opportunity to present 
their case.89 A trial-court like hearing only occurs after the preliminary order is appealed 
to an administrative law judge.90 In sum, it belies any sense to think Congress intended 
 
83 See supra note 27.
84 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
85 See Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 862 n.37 (“In most instances, of course, where Congress
intends review to be confined to the administrative record, it so indicates, either expressly or by use of a
term like ‘substantial evidence’ which has ‘become a term of art to describe the basis on which an
administrative record is to be judged by a reviewing court.’”) (internal citations omitted).
86 See Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints under Section 806 of the Corporate and
Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg.
52,104, 52112 (2004) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1980).
87 Hanna, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 1326-1331. The OSHA preliminary order cannot become a “final decision,”
and hence not reviewable in a de novo case, unless the SOX complainant fails to object to the preliminary
order within 30 days of receiving the OSHA findings. See 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)A); 29 C.F.R. §
1980.106(a), (b)(2). If a SOX plaintiff sues in federal district court within 30 days of receiving the OSHA
findings, the preliminary order should not be a “final decision.” If a SOX plaintiff sues in federal district
court more than 30 days after receiving the OSHA findings, presumably he would have needed to have
objected to the findings at the administrative level in order to proceed with the de novo suit. See Hanna,
348 F. Supp. 2d at 1325-30.
88 Hanna, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 1331; 29 C.F.R. § 1980.104.
89 Id.
90 29 C.F.R. § 1980.107.
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for SOX plaintiffs, who sue in federal district court after the 180-day deadline passes and 
who, to that point, have only received a preliminary finding from OSHA, to be limited to 
arguing in their “de novo federal court case” whether the OSHA investigator correctly 
determined if a SOX violation occurred, given that the OSHA investigator has only 
conducted a brief investigation, no trial-court like hearing has yet to be conducted, and 
the preliminary “reasonable cause” finding is not even a finding as to whether or not a 
violation in fact occurred.  
 Despite the fact that in most SOX actions in federal district court there is little, if 
any, agency record to review, the statute opens up the possibility that some SOX actions 
in federal district court will be brought after a substantial agency record has been 
developed.  The statute permits complaints to bring an action in district court for de novo 
review if there has been no final decision of the Secretary within 180 days of the filing of 
the administrative complaint and there is no delay due to the complainant’s bad faith.91
For example, under the literal language of the statute, if an administrative law judge 
makes a decision 300 days after the administrative complaint is filed that the employer 
did not violate SOX, the complainant could then appeal the administrative finding to the 
Administrative Review Board.  While the ARB appeal is being conducted, the 
complainant could then bring suit in federal district court because there has been no “final 
decision” within 180 days.  Similarly, assume the complainant fully litigates the case 
through the administrative scheme and receives a “final decision” from the 
Administrative Review Board 500 days after the administrative complaint was filed.  The 
complainant then bring suit in federal district court because the “final decision” of the 
Secretary did not occur within 180 days of the filing of the administrative complaint.92
In both of these scenarios, the federal court fact-finder would have a substantial agency 
record and findings to review.   
 It is questionable whether the courts will interpret the statute to allow SOX 
plaintiffs who have had their day in court at the administrative level, through an ALJ 
hearing and/or ARB appeal, to bring a de novo case in federal district court.  The 
Department of Labor takes the position that federal courts should apply collateral 
estoppel and res judicata principles if a complainant brings a SOX action in federal 
district court following extensive administrative litigation that has resulted in a decision 
by an administrative law judge or the ARB.93 Such principles would be applied to 
preclude those suits on the basis that Congress did not intend for SOX plaintiffs to get a 
second bite at the apple, so to speak.   
 The Department of Labor believes it would be “a waste of the resource of the 
parties, the Department, and the courts for complainants to pursue duplicative 
 
91 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 1980.114
92 69 Fed. Reg. 52104, 52111 (2004) (“This statutory structure creates the possibility that a complainant
will have litigated a claim before the agency, will receive a decision from an administrative law judge, and
will then file a complaint in Federal court while the case is pending on review by the Board. The Act might
even be interpreted to allow a complainant to bring an action in Federal court after receiving a final
decision from the Board, if that decision was issued more than 180 days after the filing of the complaint.”).
93 69 Fed. Reg. 52104, 52111 (2004).
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litigation.”94 The Department’s position regarding duplicative litigation after extensive 
administrative adjudication is certainly understandable on efficiency grounds.  Moreover, 
the allowance of a federal district court suit after a full and complete administrative 
adjudication would appear to be somewhat at odds with the appellate judicial review 
procedures allowed under SOX after a full administrative adjudication.95 However, SOX 
would not be the first federal employment discrimination statute to be interpreted to 
allow complainants to fully litigate an administrative complaint and subsequently pursue 
a de novo case in federal court.  Federal employees are able to pursue a full 
administrative adjudication of their Title VII discrimination claims.96 A federal 
employee who is displeased with the final decision of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Agency may bring a de novo civil action in federal district court.97 De novo 
review for federal employees asserting Title VII claims in federal district court involves a 
de novo trial in which there must be judicial findings concerning liability and remedy 
based on the evidence introduced in the federal court case, which is not limited to the 
evidence from the administrative record.98 In other words, there is a new trial on the 
entire case on both questions of fact and issues of law conducted as if there had been no 
administrative trial in the first instance.99 If a second bite at the apple is allowed in SOX, 
as it is for federal employees under Title VII, the plain language of the SOX statute and 
its legislative history indicate that de novo review entails a de novo trial in which the 
fact-finder is not limited to consideration of either the administrative record or the 
administrative findings.   
 A SOX action in federal district court involves a de novo trial on the entire case 
on both questions of fact and issues of law.  The de novo trial is conducted as if there had 
been no administrative proceeding in the first place.  The fact-finder is not limited to 
considerations of the administrative record or the findings of the Department of Labor.  
The parties should have discovery rights and the ability to introduce a variety of evidence 
according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence, just as 
they would have if they had filed a typical Title VII action or any other civil action.  “De 
novo review” in SOX means de novo trial.       
ii. De novo review allows for a de novo jury trial 
 
94 Id.
95 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(A); 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(4)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1980.112(a).
96 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b).
97 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c); Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976).
98 See Chandler, 425 U.S. at 843-62; Morris v. Rumsfeld, 420 F.3d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 2006) (a de novo trial
under § 2000e-16(c) requires the court to decide the issues essential to the plaintiff’s claims, including
liability, without deferring to any prior administrative adjudication); Scott v. Johanns, 409 F.3d 466, 471-72
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Under Title VII, federal employees who secure a final administrative disposition finding
discrimination and ordering relief have a choice: they may either accept the disposition and its award, or
file a civil action, trying de novo both liability and remedy. They may not, however, seek de novo review
of just the remedial award.”); Timmons v. White, 314 F.3d 1229, 1232-38 (10th Cir. 2003) (plaintiff who
brings a de novo action under 2000e-16(c) is not entitled to limit review to the issue of remedy only; §
2000e-16(c) action requires independent judicial determination of liability and remedy through a trial de
novo not confined to the administrative record or administrative findings).
99 See Timmons, 314 F.3d at 1233-34.
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De novo review in SOX means de novo trial.  That is, a new trial on the entire 
case in which a fresh, independent determination concerning liability and remedy is 
made.  The determination is not limited to or constricted by the administrative record; nor 
is any deference due the Department of Labor’s conclusions.  The next question becomes 
whether a judge, as opposed to a jury, must make the independent determination.  The 
statute is not clear on this point.  The statute does not say that a jury conducts the de novo 
review; nor does it say that the federal judge conducts the de novo review.  Yet it is likely 
that Congress intended for de novo jury trials. 
 The main reason why the statute should be interpreted to allow a jury to conduct 
the de novo review, i.e., make factual findings concerning liability and remedial relief, is 
the legislative history states provides that the whistleblower may bring a “de novo case in 
federal court with a jury trial available.”100 (emphasis added).  This is some evidence of 
Congressional intent.  Second, although an understandable knee-jerk reaction would be to 
associate de novo review with decision-making by a judge, as opposed to a jury, it would 
be unwise to do so here given the fact that the statute specifically allows for the SOX 
action to be brought at law.  Actions at law were typically tried to juries.101 In contrast, 
the chancellor acted as the trier of fact and decision-maker on all issues in an action in 
equity; the equity courts did not grant jury trials.102 Finally, there are numerous 
examples of statutes in which a legislature has provided for a de novo jury trial.  Thus, it 
would not be ground-breaking for Congress to have intended for a de novo jury trial in 
SOX.  In the criminal law context, for example, Tennessee has a two-tiered trial system 
for juveniles in which a juvenile defendant may opt for a bench trial in the juvenile 
court.103 After a bench trial, the defendant may opt to appeal to the circuit court for a de 
novo jury trial.104 Massachusetts had a similar type of optional de novo jury trial system 
until 1996.105 In 1970, five states provided a bench trial for misdemeanors from which 
the defendant could seek de novo review by a jury.106 In the civil law context, Congress 
provided for a de novo jury trial on the amount of an administrative penalty issued by the 
Secretary of the Interior under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.107
It has also provided for a de novo jury trial in civil actions brought by federal employees 
under the 1972 amendments to Title VII, which were previously discussed.108 The jury 
 
100 See supra note 27.
101 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, § 2.6(1), at 149 (2d ed. 1993) (“Equity courts did not grant jury
trials; law courts did.”).
102 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, § 2.6(2), at 153 (“The old separate courts of equity did not afford
jury trial as of right. The chancellor acted as trier of fact as well as decision-maker on issues of conscience
or rules.”).
103 See U.S. v. Turner, 438 F.3d 67, 68-69 (1st Cir. 2006).
104 Id.
105 See Johnson v. Mahoney, 424 F.3d 83, 85 (1st Cir. 2005).
106 See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 137, 141-43 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
107 See National Independent Coal Operators’ Ass’n v. Kleppe, 423 U.S. 388, 393 (1976); Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, § 109(a)(4), 83 Stat. 742 (1969).
108 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1), (c)(1); West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 221, 227
(1999) (jury trial provision in 1981a(c) applies to complaining party who sues under 2000e-16(c) and seeks
compensatory damages).
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trial right applies to federal employees who sue in court under § 2000e-16(c) because of 
the 1991 Civil Rights Act.109
b. The SOX Remedial Provision 
Congress provided in the SOX statute for make-whole relief, which includes 
“compensatory damages” and “special damages.”  A nuanced look at the statute reveals 
that “compensatory” and “special” damages include monetary damages.  Monetary 
damages that compensate a party for his or her loss are generally viewed as legal 
relief.110 Therefore, Feltner and Lorrillard, cases which focus on the Congressional use 
of “terms of art” that connote legal relief, instruct the SOX interpretation. 
 The statutory language is curious.  The statute generally provides that the 
prevailing SOX employee “shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee 
whole.”  The reference in § 1514A(c)(1) to “make-whole” relief does not necessarily take 
a side as to whether the relief available is legal, equitable, or both.111 But the description 
in § 1514A(c)(2) to reinstatement, back pay, and special damages as being 
“compensatory damages” makes one pause.112 Compensatory damages are traditionally 
a legal remedy, but the statute is befuddling if it truly means what it says.113 Back pay 
could perhaps be viewed as compensatory damages and thus legal relief, which Part III of 
the article explains.114 Special damages in the SOX context, if interpreted to include 
non-pecuniary damages such as emotional distress, mental anguish, and reputational 
damages, are also appropriately characterized as “compensatory damages.”115 Such 
damages would clearly be legal relief.  But reinstatement cannot be characterized as 
compensatory damages.  The remedy of reinstatement has uniformly been viewed as 
injunctive relief and therefore equitable in nature.116
109 Id.
110 See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U..S. 248, 255 (1993) (“Money damages are, of course, the classic
form of legal relief.”); City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 710-11 (“The Court has recognized that compensation
is a purpose ‘traditionally associated with legal relief.’”) (quoting Feltner, 523 U.S. at 352); Woodell v.
International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, Local 71, 502 U.S. 93, 97 (1991) (“Generally, an award of
money damages was the traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law.”); 1 JAMES WM. MOORE, ET
AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 2.06[1][c] (2006) (if a claim seeks only monetary damages, the claim
will usually be legal and the parties entitled to a jury trial because monetary damages were the traditional
form of relief offered in the courts of law); 1 John N. Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence § 237d
(5th ed. 1941) (“The award of mere compensatory damages, which are almost always unliquidated, is a
remedy peculiarly belonging to the province of the law courts, requiring the aid of a jury in their
assessment, and inappropriate to the judicial functions and position of a chancellor.”).
111 Compare Rogers v. Hartford Accident Life & Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 933, 944 (5th Cir. 1999) (“make whole
relief” is actually compensatory, i.e., legal, relief not recoverable under ERISA § 502(a)(3)) with Squires v.
Bonser, 54 F.3d 168, 172-73 (3d Cir. 1995) (reinstatement, an equitable remedy, advances the policy goals
of make-whole relief and deterrence in a way in which money damages cannot).
112 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2), supra note 39.
113 See supra note 110.
114 See infra Part III.A.2.b.
115 KOHN, supra note 1 at 108.
116 See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMDEIES § 1.2, at 11 (2d ed. 1993), 2 DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES §
6.10(5) at 226 (reinstatement is an equitable remedy as it is basically injunctive relief and the injunction
was historically an equitable remedy); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v, Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 211
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The answer to this seeming conundrum entails an understanding of the 
whistleblower provisions in two federal statutes: the Wendell H. Ford Aviation 
Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR21) and the False Claims Act 
(FCA).117 The AIR21 whistleblower protection provision prohibits an air carrier from 
discharging or otherwise discriminating against any employee with respect to 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because the employee 
provided to the employer or Federal Government information relating to any violation or 
alleged violation of any order, regulation, or standard of the Federal Aviation 
Administration or any other provision of Federal law relating to air carrier safety.118 The 
FCA whistleblower protection provision protects employees who report that their 
employers have submitted fraudulent bills to the United States Government.119
The remedial parts of both the AIR21 whistleblower provision and the FCA 
whistleblower provision are crucial to understanding the remedial portion of the SOX 
whistleblower provision.120 The SOX statute provides that DOL administrative 
proceedings under Sarbanes-Oxley will be governed by the “rules and procedures” of 
 
n.1 (2002) (injunction is an inherently equitable remedy); Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 583 n.11 (“judgments
compelling employment, reinstatement, or promotion are equitable.”).
117 See 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (AIR21); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (FCA).
118 49 U.S.C. § 42121(a) provides:
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST AIRLINE EMPLOYEES. No air carrier or contractor or subcontractor of an air 
carrier may discharge an employee or otherwise discriminate against an employee with respect to 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because the employee (or any person acting 
pursuant to a request of the employee) 
 (1) provided, caused to be provided, or is about to provide (with any knowledge of the employer) 
or cause to be provided to the employer or Federal Government information relating to any violation or 
alleged violation of any order, regulation, or standard of the Federal Aviation Administration or any other 
provision of Federal Law relating to air carrier safety under this subtitle or any other law of the United 
States; 
 (2) has filed, caused to be filed, or is about to file (with any knowledge of the employer) or cause 
to be filed a proceeding relating to any violation or alleged violation of any order, regulation, or standard of 
the Federal Aviation Administration or any other provision of Federal law relating to air carrier safety 
under this subtitle or any other law of the United States; 
 (3) testified or is about to testify in such a proceeding; or 
 (4) assisted or participated or is about to assist or participate in such a proceeding.   
119 The False Claims Act penalizes contractors who submit fraudulent bills to the United States. 31
U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731. Private individuals can file qui tam actions under the Act, and, if successful, take a
part of the recovery as a reward for their service. See Neal v. Honeywell, 191 F.3d 827, 829 (7th Cir. 1999).
“Qui tam” is an abbreviation of the Latin phrase “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro si ipso in hac parte
sequitur” meaning “Who sues on behalf of the King as well as for himself.” A qui tam action is brought by
an informer, under a statute (here the False Claims Act) which establishes a penalty for the commission of a
certain act (here submitting fraudulent bills to the federal government), and provides that the same shall be
recoverable in a civil action, part of the penalty to go to the person who brings such action and the
remainder to the government or some other institution. It is called a “qui tam action” because the plaintiff
states that he sues as well for the government as for himself. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 867 (Abridged
6th ed. 1991). In addition to providing the right to file a qui tam action, the Act also contains a
whistleblower-protection provision, which prohibits retaliation against employees who turn in their
employers for violating the Act. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).
120 See 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(3)(B) (AIR21 whistleblower remedies provision); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)
(FCA whistleblower remedies provision).
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AIR21, 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b).121 Section 42121(b)(3)(B) details the remedies available 
to a prevailing AIR21 complainant by stating that if a violation occurs, the Secretary of 
Labor shall order the air carrier to “(i) take affirmative action to abate the violation, (ii) 
reinstate the complainant to his or her position together with compensation (including 
backpay) and restore the terms, conditions, and privileges associated with his or her 
employment; and (iii) provide compensatory damages to the complainant.” (emphasis 
added).122 Although compensatory damages are often viewed in the law as 
encompassing both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages123, the AIR21 whistleblower 
statute views “compensatory damages” as primarily non-pecuniary, separate and apart 
from pecuniary damages such as backpay.124 Indeed, this is not surprising given the fact 
that the AIR21 remedial provision was modeled, to some extent, off of other federal 
whistleblower remedial provisions, such as the one in the Energy Reorganization Act.125
It is established law that “compensatory damages” are available under the ERA 
whistleblower provision and other environmental whistleblower statutes and that 
“compensatory damages” under these statutes means non-pecuniary damages, which 
include recovery for mental anguish, emotional distress, pain and suffering, humiliation, 
loss of professional reputation, etc.126 The law in this area was clear at the time Congress 
enacted Sarbanes-Oxley in July 2002.127 Although there was little administrative case 
law on the interpretation of “compensatory damages” under AIR21 at the time SOX was 
enacted, there is no reason to believe that the term “compensatory damages” in AIR21 
means anything other than what it means under the ERA and other whistleblower statutes 
administered by OSHA.  Indeed, six months after SOX’s enactment, an Administrative 
 
121 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(A) (“IN GENERAL. – An action under paragraph (1)(A) shall be governed
under the rules and procedures set forth in section 42121(b) of title 49, United States Code.”). A person
who alleges retaliation in violation of SOX may seek relief by “filing a complaint with the Secretary of
Labor.” 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(1)(a).
122 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(3)(B).
123 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1979) (“Compensatory damages are the damages
awarded to a person as compensation, indemnity, or restitution for harm sustained by him.”).
Compensatory damages are divided into two categories: pecuniary and non-pecuniary. Id. at §§ 905 and
906. Non-pecuniary compensatory damages include compensation for bodily harm and emotional distress,
and are awarded without proof of pecuniary loss. Id. at § 905.
124 Lawson v. United Airlines, Inc., 2002-AIR-6 (ALJ Dec. 20, 2002) (compensatory damages under
AIR21 statute may be awarded for emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and
humiliation).
125 See e.g., Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints under Section 519 of the Wendell
H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, 67 Fed. Reg. 15454 (April 1, 2002)
(interim final rule) (in drafting regulations governing AIR21, Assistant Secretary of OSHA gave
consideration to the whistleblower regulations of the ERA, when appropriate).
126 Hobby v. Georgia Power Co., ARB No. 98-166 at 31-35, ALJ No. 1990-ERA-30 (ARB Feb. 9, 2001),
affirmed Case No. 01-10916 (11th Cir. 2002) (awarding $250,000 in compensatory damages for emotional
distress and damage to professional reputation); Van der Meer v. Western Kentucky University, ARB No.
97-078, ALJ No. 1995-ERA-38 (ARB Apr. 20, 1998) (awarding $40,000 in compensatory damages for
public humiliation); Creekmore v. ABB Power Systems Energy Services, Inc., No. 93-ERA-24 (Feb. 14,
1996) (awarding $40,000 in compensatory damages for emotional pain and suffering); Trueblood v. Von
Roll America, Inc., 2002-WPC-3 to 6, 2003-WP-1 (ALJ Mar. 26, 2003) (awarding $50,000 in
compensatory damages for mental anguish, anxiety, and damage to career aspirations); Michaud v. BSP
Transport, Inc. ARB No. 97-113, ALJ Case No. 95-STA-29 (ARB Oct. 9, 1997).
127 Id.
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Law Judge ruled perfunctorily in an AIR21 case that the AIR21 statute contemplated the 
possible award of compensatory damages, which included awards for emotional pain and 
suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.128 In short, it would not be 
too much of a stretch to conclude that SOX remedies include compensatory damages, 
meaning recovery for non-pecuniary loss, in order to align with AIR21 and ERA law.129
The devil’s advocate, however, will point out that the SOX whistleblower statute 
does not explicitly adopt the AIR21 “rules and procedures” for SOX federal court 
actions.130 Indeed, that would have made little sense because the adoption of AIR21 
“rules and procedures” is designed to align SOX administrative proceedings with AIR21 
administrative proceedings on procedural issues.131 And, in any event, the statutory 
reference to AIR21 “rules and procedures” should in no way be interpreted to incorporate 
AIR21 remedies.  “Rules and procedures” are not remedies, despite the fact that the 
literal language of the statute incorporates all of § 42121(b).132 Moreover, the statute 
specifically states that the remedies available in SOX administrative actions and SOX 
federal court actions are provided in the SOX remedial provision.133 If Congress 
intended to explicitly incorporate the AIR21 remedies, it could easily have done so and 
there would have then been no need for an independent SOX remedial provision. These 
are all fair points and might be enough, without more, to shoot down the interpretation 
posited.  But, in point of fact, the legislative history bolsters the view that courts should 
imply the right to a jury trial. 
 It appears that Congress considered compensatory damages as a distinct remedy, 
separate and apart from reinstatement and backpay, even though the explicit statutory 
language would say otherwise.  The Section-by-Section analysis of Section 806 states 
that “[§ 1514A(c)] governs remedies and provides for the reinstatement of the 
whistleblower, back pay, and compensatory damages to make a victim whole, including 
reasonable attorney fees and costs, as remedies if the claimant prevails.” (emphasis 
added).134 The examples of compensatory damages referenced do not specifically 
include damages for mental anguish, emotional distress, reputational injury, and the like, 
but the use of the phrase “to make a victim whole” certainly provides fodder for such an 
 
128 See supra note 126.
129 Sarbanes-Oxley follows the AIR21 requirement that a complaint will be dismissed if it fails to make a
prima facie showing that protected behavior or conduct was a contributing factor in the unfavorable
personnel decision alleged in the complaint. The “contributing factor” language is identical to language in
the employee protection provisions of ERA and AIR21 and thus should be interpreted pursuant to
established interpretations of the phrase under ERA case law. See Procedures for the Handling of
Discrimination Complaints Under Section 806 of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of
2002, Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg. 52104, 52106-107 (Aug. 24, 2004) (final
rule)
130 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2).
131 See supra note 17.
132 Recall that AIR21 remedies are located in 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(3)(B).
133 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1) and (c).
134 See 148 CONG. REC. S7418 (daily ed. July 26, 2002); CORPORATE FRAUD RESPONSIBILITY: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, Vol. 3, Doc. No. 85, Corporate and
Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Senate Report No. 107-146, 13-14 (William Manz ed.,
William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 2003).
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interpretation of the statute.135 If Congress viewed compensatory damages, backpay, and 
reinstatement as separate remedies, it becomes easier to see why Senator Leahy stated in 
the legislative history that jury trials are available in SOX actions.  Congress could 
rightfully have considered backpay and non-pecuniary damages, like reputational and 
mental anguish damages, to be legal relief in which the Seventh Amendment right to jury 
trial would attach.136
The legislative history inquiry would be more determinative if it included more 
than just Senator Leahy’s statement about the jury trial guarantee and the statement about 
the remedial provision in the Section-by-Section analysis, but those two pieces of 
information appear to be the only legislative history clues.  There is nothing else in the 
legislative history that would either support or contradict the idea that Congress intended 
to guarantee the right to a jury trial.    
 If one accepts the argument that Congress adopted the AIR21/ERA 
interpretation of “compensatory damages” to include reputational and mental anguish 
damages, which the legislative history seems to support, it would follow that Congress 
also intended to provide for legal relief.137 For those unwilling to make that stretch, a 
more satisfying interpretation is available through comparing the SOX whistleblower 
provision with the FCA whistleblower provision.   
 It is a well-known principle of statutory construction that when a federal statute is 
almost identical to another previously enacted federal statute, the judicial interpretation of 
language from the prior federal act is persuasive evidence as to the meaning of terms in 
the later statute, even if the later statute makes no reference to the original statute.138
135 Id.
136 Culling the legislative history of a statute for signs of intended Congressional meaning, especially
when the legislative history is sparse, is a challenging task. The interpreter who takes such a route should
remind himself of the possible unreliability of such history and the fact that the exercise is something of a
construct because a collective entity cannot have an “intent.” Nelson, supra note 39 at 362. But it is
nonetheless a useful exercise in the present case. The SOX statute uses remedial terms of art that are
intended to convey a particular legal meaning. The meaning can be derived from the way in which the law
of remedies tends to define those particular words. But the interpreter must be open to evidence that
Congress attached a specific meaning to a particular term, especially when that evidence supports an
interpretation that is consistent with remedies law. See e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 39 at 356 (“the
original expectations of the Congress that enacted the statute . . . are important in a democracy where the
legislature is the primary source of lawmaking . . . . The most authoritative historical evidence is the
legislative history of the statute, because it is a contemporary record made by the enacting legislators. In
some instances, the legislative history may provide an example or suggest an application that squarely fits
within a subsequent interpretive problem.”).
137 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 39 at 355 (noting that textual analysis of a statute sometimes involves
looking “to similar provisions in other statutes, especially those regulating similar things.”).
138 2B NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 52.02 (The fact that a federal
statute is almost a literal copy of another federal statute is persuasive evidence of a reenactment of that
statute and it is therefore proper to the decision construing the statutory language of the original statute. It is
not necessary for the statutes to be identical in order for the rule to apply. As an example, cases construing
the Railroad Revitalization & Regulatory Reform Act are relevant to analyze the Federal Motor Carrier
Act.).
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This concept is related somewhat to the doctrine that related statutes should be read in 
pari materia.139
The SOX whistleblower statute and FCA whistleblower statute attack similar 
evils, both statutes protect employees from retaliation for reporting fraud.  SOX prohibits 
retaliation for reporting corporate fraud; the FCA prohibits retaliation for reporting 
governmental fraud.  Therefore, it would not be surprising if the remedial provisions of 
both these statutes were similar.  In fact, they are almost identical.140 The fact that 
Congress appears to have lifted the remedial language in the FCA statute and placed it on 
the SOX statute should lead to the conclusion that Congress intended FCA whistleblower 
case law to govern the meaning of remedial terms in the SOX statute and the right to a 
jury trial.141 If that is the case, Congressional intent to provide the opportunity for SOX 
plaintiffs to seek legal relief in the form of non-pecuniary damages and obtain a jury trial 
becomes evident.   
 Both SOX and the FCA allow for the recovery of “compensation for any special 
damages sustained as a result of the discrimination.”  Prior to the passage of SOX, the 
federal courts of appeals had uniformly interpreted “special damages” in the FCA 
retaliation context to include damages for emotional distress on the ground that back pay 
and reinstatement are the usual consequences of the FCA retaliation violation, while 
emotional distress damages are the unusual consequence of such a violation, and thus are 
special damages according to the established common-law meaning of “special 
 
139 Id. at § 51.03 (in determining whether a statute should be read in pari material, the guiding principle is
that if it is natural and reasonable to think that the understanding of members of the legislature be
influenced by another statute, then a court called on to construe the act in question should allow itself to be
similarly influenced).
140 Compare the SOX remedial language, see supra Part II.A., with the FCA remedial language. The FCA
remedial provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) states: “[a]ny employee who is discharged . . . shall be entitled to
all relief necessary to make the employee whole. Such relief shall include reinstatement with the same
seniority status such employee would have had but for the discrimination, 2 times the amount of backpay,
interest on the backpay, and compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the
discrimination, including litigation costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.” The primary difference between
SOX and the FCA is that the FCA provides for double back pay. The SOX legislative history demonstrates
that S. 2010, Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, as introduced to the Senate on
March 12, 2002, contained the double back pay remedy. See CORPORATE FRAUD RESPONSIBILITY: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, Vol. 3., Doc. No. 78 S., 2010, Corporate
and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, as introduced, 10 (William Manz ed., William S. Hein Co.,
Inc. 2003). Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act tracked almost exactly the provisions of S. 2010. See
148 CONG. REC. S7418 (daily ed. July 26, 2002). Section 806, as enacted, does not contain a double back
pay remedy. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)(B). SOX also specifically allows for the recovery of expert
witness fees. Id. at § 1514A(c)(2)(C). The FCA does not specifically list expert witness fees as a form of
special damages. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). Neither SOX nor the FCA contain a punitive damages remedy,
although punitive damages were a part of the SOX remedial structure in S.2010, as introduced. See
CORPORATE FRAUD RESPONSIBILITY, Vol. 3, No. 78, at 10-11.
141 Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 537 (1947)
(“Words of art bring their art with them. They bear the meaning of their habitat . . . . And if a word is
obviously transplanted from another legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it brings
the old soil with it.”) (emphasis added).
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damages.”142 None of the appellate courts had ruled against the recovery of emotional 
distress damages on the basis that emotional distress damages are not “special damages” 
under the FCA because they are not listed in the statute as an example of special 
damages.143 The limited case law indicates that FCA retaliation cases have been tried to 
juries.144 Because FCA whistleblower plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial, SOX 
whistleblower plaintiffs should have the same right.  Implying the right to jury trial in 
SOX actions would also be consistent with court decisions that have implied the right to a 
jury trial in other federal anti-discrimination statutes that provide for lost wages and other 
damages.145
Finally, consider the question from Judge Posner’s “imaginative reconstruction” 
perspective.146 Imaginative reconstruction is an interpretive technique that requires a 
judge to “think his way as best he can into the minds of the enacting legislators and 
imagine how they would have wanted the statute applied to case at bar.”147 Imaginative 
reconstruction is typically associated with intentionalists, but not all commentators 
believe that textualists repudiate the concept.148 Professor Nelson argues that textualists 
use imaginative reconstruction when deciding severability of a statute, deciding how to 
conform a statute to dubious precedent a court is not prepared to overrule, criticizing the 
use of imaginative reconstruction in particular cases, and interpreting certain ambiguous 
statutes.149 While commentators may disagree as to the propriety of the technique, I 
believe it aids in deducing this interpretive puzzle.150
In addition to the typical items that have already been surveyed—Supreme Court 
precedent, statutory structure, contemporary statutes on related enactments, and 
legislative history, the imaginative reconstructionist looks at the values and attitudes of 
the period in which the legislation was enacted and considerations drawn from a broadly 
based conception of the public interest.151 The SOX whistleblower statute was enacted 
in the wake of corporate scandals that left investors and pensioners penniless when the 
house of cards built by Enron and WorldCom tumbled down.  Congress chose to provide 
a judicial remedy to future discharged corporate whistleblowers—not merely an 
administrative remedy.  The public has a stake in holding corporations to account when 
 
142 See Hammond v. Northland Counseling Center, Inc., 218 F.3d 886, 893 (8th Cir. 2000); Neal v.
Honeywell, 191 F.3d 827, 832 (7th Cir. 1999).
143 Id.
144 See Neal, 191 F.3d at 829; Wilkins v. St. Louis Housing Authority, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1082-1085
(E.D. Mo. 2001).
145 See Frizzell v. Southwest Motor Freight, 154 F.3d 641, 642-44 (6th Cir. 1998) (jury right implied in
FMLA).
146 Posner, supra note 43 at 817.
147 Id.
148 Nelson, supra note 39 at 403-04.
149 Id. at 403-13.
150 The seminal example of imaginative reconstruction is Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in Fishgold v.
Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corporation, 154 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1946). Judge Hand used imaginative
reconstruction to decide whether a veterans reemployment right provided in a federal statute should be
construed narrowly or broadly based in part on the public circumstances at the time of the enactment. Id. at
788-89. Judge Hand used imaginative reconstruction because the statutory language was ambiguous. I
advocate imaginative reconstruction because the statutory language in SOX is similarly befuddling.
151 Posner, supra note 43 at 818-20.
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whistleblowers are penalized for reporting corporate fraud because it wants to preempt an 
Enron replay.  Against that background it is likely that Congress would have wanted the 
public to have some role in making findings concerning corporations who punish 
employees for reporting corporate fraud.152 The jury, a cross-section of the community 
that speaks for the general public, is the logical choice to serve as the conduit of the 
public interest in this area of public concern.  Part III of this article will elaborate on the 
role of the jury in SOX whistleblower actions.             
 The remedial parts of the AIR21 whistleblower provision and the FCA 
whistleblower provision, along with the SOX legislative history, reveal that the SOX 
remedial provision’s reference to reinstatement as “compensatory damages” is simply a 
mistake.  Congress believed that reinstatement, back pay, and compensatory/special 
damages were three separate remedies.  “Special damages” and “compensatory damages” 
were interchangeable terms used by Congress primarily to enforce the notion that non-
pecuniary damages—emotional distress, mental anguish, and reputational damages, for 
example—are allowable under SOX, just as they are in AIR21 and FCA whistleblower 
cases.  Viewing SOX remedies in this light, Senator Leahy’s reference in the legislative 
history to the right to a jury trial in SOX actions is understandable.  Congress provided 
SOX whistleblowers with an action at law to pursue legal relief in the form of non-
pecuniary damages and back pay.  Congress had no need to explicitly provide a jury trial 
right in the statute itself because the Seventh Amendment guaranteed the right in cases 
where the SOX plaintiff requested legal relief.  Accordingly, courts may imply a statutory 
right to a jury trial in cases where SOX plaintiffs seek non-pecuniary damages.   Such an 
interpretation coincides with the statutory purpose and is consistent with the relevant 
precedent concerning implying the right to a jury trial in a statute. 
III.   THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION: SOX AND THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT 
If the federal courts decline to imply the right to a jury trial from the SOX 
whistleblower statute, they must grapple with the constitutional question:  whether the 
Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial 
for SOX cases brought in federal court.  The answer to this question, according to 
Supreme Court precedent, turns on whether the nature of the SOX action is best viewed 
as an action at law or one in equity and whether the nature of the relief provided by the 
SOX statute is legal or equitable.  The vast majority of practitioners, scholars, and judges 
lack a detailed knowledge of the historical divide between law and equity.  Delaware is 
an example of a jurisdiction that maintains the historical distinction between law and 
equity, but it is the exception to the rule.153 Most attorneys operate in civil procedure 
systems that have merged law and equity entirely.  The federal civil procedure system, of 
course, is the prime example. With the adoption of the Rules Enabling Act in 1934 and 
 
152 See, e.g., Fishgold, 154 F.2d at 788-89 (“Against that background [situation that existed in September
1940 as to whether the United States would sent troops overseas to war] it is not likely that a proposal
would then have been accepted which gave industrial priority, regardless of their length of employment, to
unmarried men—for the most part under thirty—over men in the thirties, forties, or fifties, who had wives
and children dependent upon them.”).
153 See Weston Inves. v. Domtar Indus., 832 A.2d 1253 (Del. 2002) (“Delaware proudly guards the historic
and important distinction between legal and equitable jurisdiction.”).
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2 in 1938, the merger of law and equity in the federal 
system became complete.154 Although memories of the divided bench have faded, the 
distinction between law and equity is of considerable practical importance in determining 
whether the right to a jury trial exists on a statutory cause of action that does not 
expressly or impliedly grant a jury-trial right.155
The jury trial clause of the Seventh Amendment states:  “In suits at common law, 
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall 
be preserved.”156 The Supreme Court has stated that the Seventh Amendment right to a 
jury trial covers more than traditional common-law actions that existed in 1791.157 The 
right also applies to newly-enacted federal statutes that create legal rights and 
remedies.158 An early Supreme Court case, Parsons v. Bedford, interpreted the Framers’ 
use of the term “common law” to include all suits in which “legal rights were to be 
ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone 
were administered.”159 The Parsons court presumed the amendment to embrace all suits 
“which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever might be the peculiar form 
which they may assume to settle legal rights.”160 More recently, the Court stated that the 
applicability of the constitutional right to jury trial in actions enforcing statutory rights, if 
the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the 
ordinary courts of law, is a matter “too obvious to be doubted.”161
Nonetheless, Congress maintains the power “to take some causes of action outside 
the scope of the Seventh Amendment by providing for their enforcement through a 
statutory proceeding or in a specialized court.”162 In National Labor Relations Board v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, for example, the Board ordered a steel company to 
reinstate employees and pay back wages for engaging in unfair labor practices.163 The 
steel company argued that it was constitutionally entitled to a jury trial, instead of a 
Board determination, because the lost wages award was equivalent to a monetary 
judgment.164 The Court labeled the suit a “statutory proceeding” and, as such, not 
subject to the Seventh Amendment requirements.165 Subsequent cases, which refined the 
Jones & Laughlin holding, revealed that the Seventh Amendment is not applicable to 
 
154 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072; FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (“There shall be one form of action to be known as ‘civil
action.’). The creation of one form of action – the “civil action” – merged the systems of law and equity
and eliminated the practice of having a “law side” and an “equity side,” each “side” having its own
particular rules and procedures. 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 2.02[2][a]
(3d ed. 1997).
155 See 1 MOORE’S FED. PRACTICE § 2.06[1][A] (1997).
156 U.S. Const., Amend. VII.
157 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2302.2 (2d ed.
1994).
158 1 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 2.06[1][b] (1997).
159 3 Pet. (28 U.S.) 433, 446-447 (1833).
160 Id.
161 Curtis, 415 U.S. at 192-193 (1974), quoting Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1114 (7th Cir. 1972).
162 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2302.2.
163 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
164 Id. at 48.
165 Id.
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administrative proceedings, at least when so-called “public rights” are concerned, due to 
the incompatibility between administrative adjudication and jury trials.166 Similarly, the 
Seventh Amendment is not implicated when Congress limits enforcement of statutory 
rights to specialized, non-Article III courts, such as bankruptcy courts.167
Under current Supreme Court case law, the SOX whistleblowers that remain in 
the SOX administrative scheme and do not opt out to federal court are not protected by 
the Seventh Amendment.  An Administrative Law Judge will hear those cases; no jury 
will be involved at the administrative level.  However, the Seventh Amendment right is 
implicated for the SOX whistleblowers that leave the administrative process for search of 
greener pastures in federal court.  For those whistleblowers, whether the right to a jury 
trial exists depends on whether the SOX action resolves legal rights.168 This entails a 
two-part analysis—the so-called “historical test.”  First, one must compare the SOX 
action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of law and equity in England to 
determine whether it is more analogous to legal forms of action existing at that time, or to 
equitable forms.  Second, one must examine the nature of the relief sought, the remedies, 
to determine whether the relief is most appropriately viewed as legal or equitable.169 Due 
to the inherent difficulties in divining a precise historical analogue, the second part of the 
test is generally viewed as the most important.170 If the SOX action is an action at law,  
one must also consider which particular issues in the case must be tried by a jury in order 
to preserve the substance of the common-law right as it existed in 1791.171
A. The Historical Approach 
 The historical test traces its roots back to Justice Story’s 1812 circuit opinion in 
United States v. Wonson.172 In Wonson, Justice Story held that in order to determine in 
which civil cases the Seventh Amendment jury right applies, courts must look to the 
English common law.173 Justice Story later expounded in the Parsons case that “suits at 
common law” referred to suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and 
 
166 Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 418, n.4 (1987); Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 460-61 (1977); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383
(1974).
167 See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 336-337 (1966); but see Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492
U.S. at 64 (fraudulent conveyance action in bankruptcy court subject to Seventh Amendment right to jury
trial).
168 Chauffeurs, Teamsters, & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990).
169 Id.; 1 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 2.06[1][c] (1997).
170 Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 (1987); 1 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 2.06[1][c] n. 12
(collecting cases).
171 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 708, 718 (1999).
172 128 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
173 Id. at 750 (“Beyond all question, the common law here alluded to . . . is the common law of England,
the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence. It cannot be necessary . . . to expound the grounds of this
opinion, because they must be obvious to every person acquainted with the history of the law.”).
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determined, as opposed to equitable rights.174 These two cases served as the foundation 
for the traditional Seventh Amendment analysis employed by the Supreme Court.175
Various commentators have criticized the traditional Seventh Amendment 
approach.  Charles Wolfram, the leading Seventh Amendment scholar, argued that the 
historical materials do not support the historical test’s allegiance to the English common 
law and concluded that the historical test is inconsistent with the “traditions of principled 
constitutionalism that have guided the Supreme Court in the interpretation of other 
commands of the Bill of Rights.”176 Kenneth Klein labeled the historical test a two 
hundred year old myth and analogized the historical test to the parable of the emperor’s 
clothes.177 Klein claimed that no historical materials support the view that the Seventh 
Amendment’s reference to common law referred to English common law.178 Akhil Reed 
Amar opined that the Supreme Court’s historical test is not the best reading of the 
amendment.179 Stanton Krauss bluntly stated that the Supreme Court’s understanding of 
the Seventh Amendment is based on nineteenth century revisionist history.180 He 
concluded that Justice Story’s interpretation of the jury trial clause in Wonson and 
Parsons was not based on the clause’s text and history, but on the result that Story 
preferred.181 Each of these commentators—Wolfram, Klein, Amar, and Krauss—suggest 
various alternative approaches to the Seventh Amendment.182
In spite of the criticism, the historical test’s vitality has remained relatively 
constant over the last one hundred plus years and it appears unlikely that the test will be 
abandoned altogether by the Court.183 Therefore, the remainder of the article focuses 
 
174 28 U.S. 433, 447 (1830).
175 See, e.g., Rachael E. Schwartz, “Everything Depends on How You Draw the Lines”: An Alternative
Interpretation of the Seventh Amendment, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L. J. 599, 600-02 (1996).
176 Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639,
721, 731 (1973).
177 Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 53
OHIO ST. L. J. 1005 (1992).
178 Id. at 1022 (“There is no recorded legislative history suggesting that the phrase “common law” referred
to the common law of England. Nor is support found in the records of the state debates, the Federalist
papers, or the writings of the commentators of the time.”).
179 Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction, 89-90 (1998).
180 Stanton D. Krauss, Commentary on Akhil Reed Amar’s the Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction
The Original Understanding of the Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 407, 460,
475 (1999) (“Whatever its precise scope, the interpretation of the Jury Trial Clause that Justice Story
propounded in Parsons, which he claimed to reflect the original understanding of its Creators, was pure ipse
dixit. Worse yet, it seems clearly to have been wrong.”).
181 Id. at 478.
182 See infra Part III.B.2.
183 In City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
historical test in a regulatory takings claim brought under Section 1983. In deciding the Seventh
Amendment question, the Court looked at whether the claims brought under Section 1983 were analogous
to common law claims that provided legal relief. Id. at 708-11. The majority held that the § 1983 suit in
question sought legal relief and therefore constituted an action at law within the meaning of the Seventh
Amendment. Id. at 709-11. The majority then considered whether particular issues in the § 1983 suit were
proper for determination by the jury under the Seventh Amendment. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, stated that history dictated whether particular issues in actions at law had to be tried by a jury, but
noted that “[w]here history does not provide a clear answer, we look to precedent and functional
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primarily on whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees the jury trial right on SOX 
actions under the historical test.  My application of the SOX remedial scheme to the 
historical test shows that the Seventh Amendment does guarantee a jury trial in certain 
SOX actions.  And, when the jury right attaches, the jury’s primary role concerns making 
the factual determination as to whether the plaintiff has proven the elements of a SOX 
action and assessing damages.  However, in light of the academic commentary criticizing 
the historical test, this part also applies the SOX action to various alternative approaches 
of the Seventh Amendment.  The article ends by elaborating on the importance of the jury 
right in SOX actions.   
1.    Nature of the Right 
The first part of the historical test is to compare the SOX claim to historical legal 
forms of action and complaints in equity available in England circa 1791 in order to 
determine whether it is more analogous to legal forms of action existing at that time or to 
complaints appropriate at equity.184 The answer to the first part of the test is not crystal 
clear in large measure because a SOX action could encompass both legal and equitable 
issues.185 Indeed, Congress specifically provided for a complainant to bring the action at 
law or equity.186 But in broad terms a SOX action is best characterized as an action at 
law. 
 A SOX whistleblower claim provides a remedy to an employee of a publicly-
traded company who reports corporate fraud either externally or internally and suffers an 
adverse employment action because of the report.187 Such an action has no exact 
counterpart in 18th-century England.  Indeed, there were relatively few publicly-traded 
companies in 18th-century England.188 The few publicly-traded companies that existed 
 
considerations.” Id. at 718. The “functional consideration” in Del Monte Dunes was whether the issues in
question were predominantly factual. Because the issue in the Section 1983 action at law was
predominantly a factual one, and factual issues are usually allocated to juries, the Court determined that the
issue in question should go to the jury. Id. at 719-721. Although somewhat hazy, Del Monte Dunes
indicates that “functional considerations” might in some circumstances be a part of the Seventh
Amendment analysis. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996), a patent case, could
also be interpreted to stand for the proposition that function and process considerations play some part in a
Seventh Amendment analysis, although Markman seems to view “functional considerations” differently
than Del Monte Dunes. Regardless, at least one commentator opines that neither Markman nor Del Monte
Dunes suggest any “radical change” to the traditional Seventh Amendment historical test. Margaret L.
Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court’s Evolving Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 68
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 256 (2000). To the extent the Supreme Court is open to expanding its Seventh
Amendment analysis to include functional considerations, however the Court defines that term, the tea
leaves do not show that the Court intends to do away with the traditional approach altogether.
184 Terry, supra note 123 at 565.
185 Id. at 570 (employees action against Union for breach of duty of fair representation encompassed both
legal and equitable issue and thus left the Court “in equipoise as to whether [employees]” were entitled to a
jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.
186 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B).
187 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)-(b).
188 Daniel M. Klerman and Paul G. Mahoney, The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from 18th
Century England at 6, University of Southern California Law School, Law and Economics Working Papers
Series, Berkeley Electronic Press, http://law.bepress.com/usclwps/art24 (2005).
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were strongly tied to the government of England and are substantially different from 
modern publicly-traded companies.189 Although no exact counterpart exists, English 
common law courts heard breach of contract, tort, and qui tam claims.  A SOX 
whistleblower claim is essentially a specialized wrongful termination suit analogous to a 
breach of contract, tort, or qui tam claim that would likely have been brought in an 
English common law court and tried to a jury in the late 1700’s. 
 The modern American employment at-will rule—that a worker can be fired at any 
time for a good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all—did not carry the day in 18th-
century England. 190 The English rule at that time presumed annual, fixed-term 
employment.191 The English rule, as expounded by William Blackstone192, had its 
origins in feudal-era laws such as the Statute of Labourers which were designed to deal 
with labor shortages and deadly epidemics such as the plague.193 The Statute of 
Labourers prohibited a servant from leaving employment before the end of a term, but 
also prohibited the master from discharging the servant before the end of a term absent 
reasonable cause.194 Although the Statute of Labourers was later repealed, the 
presumption in favor of annual term employment with job protection for servants 
remained a part of English law throughout the 18th-century.195 Wrongful discharge 
claims brought by English servants circa 1791 were viewed as common-law breach of 
contract actions and tried by juries in common-law courts such as the King’s Bench and 
 
189 Id. at 27-28.
190 See Montgomery County Hosp. Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex. 1998) (“For well over a
century, the general rule in this State [Texas], as in most American jurisdictions, has been that absent a
specific agreement to the contrary, employment may be terminated by the employer or the employee at
will, for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all.”). The at-will rule did not appear as a staple of
American employment law until the late nineteenth/early twentieth century and appears to have been
spurred by Horace Wood’s 1877 treatise on master servant relations, H. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT §
134 (1877), which provided:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at 
will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is on him to 
establish it by proof.  A hiring at so much a day, week, month or year, no time being 
specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a day even, 
but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may serve.     
191 See The King v. Inhabitants of Hampreston, 101 Eng. Rep. 116 (K.B. 1793); Timothy J. Heinsz, The
Assault on the Employment at Will Doctrine: Management Considerations, 48 MO. L. REV. 855, 859
(1983).
192 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries 413 (1765).
If the hiring be general without any particular time limited, the law construes it to be a
hiring for a year; upon a principle of natural equity, that the servant shall serve, and the
master shall maintain him, throughout all the revolutions of the respective seasons, as
well when there is work to be done as when there is not.
193 RICHARD CARLSON, EMPLOYMENT LAW 651 (2005).
194 See Statute of Labourers, 23 Edw. III, c.1 (1349), Statute of Labourers, 5 Eliz. I, c.4 (1562); Jay M.
Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 120 (1976);
Heinsz, supra note 191 at 859.
195 See Heinz supra note 191 at 859 (“In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the English rule provided
that unless expressed to the contrary, a term of employment was presumed to be for one year.”); 25
Halsbury’s Laws of England 480-81 (3d ed. 1958).
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Common Pleas.196 Because an improper employment discharge in 18th-century England 
would have been viewed as a breach of contract claim remediable by the English 
common law, a SOX whistleblower action, which at its core is a wrongful discharge 
claim for implied breach of contract, is analogous to a common-law breach of 
employment contract claim and thus an action at law in which the right to jury trial is 
preserved by the Seventh Amendment.197
Another apt analogy is to tort law.  Curtis v. Loether and Del Monte Dunes affirm 
the general principle that a federal statutory claim that allows for monetary damages upon 
the violation of an imposed legal duty—just like SOX—sounds in tort, and thus a 
plaintiff asserting such a claim is entitled to a jury trial.198 The Curtis case concerned a 
suit for violations of the fair housing provisions of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1968, a race discrimination statute.199 The Del Monte Dunes case involved a § 1983 
action for deprivation of property.200 In both cases, the Court explained why the 
statutory causes of action were best characterized as tort claims and made clear that a tort 
action seeking monetary damages, although provided for by statute and not the common 
law, is generally a “suit at common law” for which the Seventh Amendment guarantees a 
jury trial.201
The Curtis Court stated that a Title VIII damages action sounds in tort because 
“the statute merely defines a new legal duty, and authorizes the courts to compensate a 
plaintiff for the injury caused by the defendant’s wrongful breach.”202 The Del Monte 
Dunes Court concluded that a § 1983 action fits within both the historical and modern 
definition of a tort claim in that “torts are remedies for invasions of certain rights, such as 
the rights to personal security, personal liberty, and property . . .” and are “designed to 
 
196 See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, §§ 1.5, 11.2 (2d ed. 1990) (breach of contract actions were
typically tried at common law in eighteenth-century England); Lebow v. American Trans Air, Inc., 86 F.3d
661 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Employment by contract was the rule in eighteenth-century England, so an improper
discharge would have been viewed as a [common-law] breach of contract action.”); accord Stonehill
College v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, 808 N.E.2d 205, 214 n.15 (Mass. 2004);
Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., Inc., 479 A.2d 781 (Conn. 1984). Examples of wrongful discharge cases
heard by English juries in common-law courts include Fawcett v. Cash, 110 Eng. Rep. 1026 (K.B. 1834)
and Beeston v. Collyer, 4 Bing. 309, [1824-1834] All E.R. 292 (C.P. 1827).
197 See, e.g., Lebow v. American Trans Air, Inc., 86 F.3d 661, 669 (7th Cir. 1996) (wrongful discharge
claim for engaging in union activities under Railway Labor Act analogous to common-law breach of
contract action); Waldrop v. Southern Co. Services, Inc., 24 F.3d 152, 156 (11th Cir. 1994) (unlawful
discharge claim under Rehabilitation Act analogous to common-law breach of contract action); Hill v.
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 934 F.2d 1518, 1524 (11th Cir. 1991) (constructive discharge claim under Jury
System Improvements Act analogous to common-law breach of contract action); Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d
1330, 1337 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1217 (1991) (unlawful discharge claim under
Rehabilitation Act is closely analogous to breach of express or implied employment contract claim);
Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Corp., 550 F.2d 834, 838 (3d Cir. 1977) (ADEA suit for back
wages is essentially a “routine contract action” in which the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial).
198 Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); City of Monterrey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterrey, LTD,
526 U.S. 687 (1999).
199 Curtis, 415 U.S. at 189-90.
200 Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 693.
201 Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195-98; Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 707-33.
202 Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196.
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provide compensation for injuries arising from the violation of legal duties.”203 Both 
Courts indicated that a statutory tort action for money damages is an action for which the 
jury right attaches because tort claims for money damages were triable to juries at 
common law.204 Other Supreme Court and federal appellate court cases also reflect this 
interpretation of the Seventh Amendment.205 Because SOX essentially defines a new 
legal duty—publicly-traded companies cannot legally fire employees who report covered 
corporate fraud—and provides monetary compensation for injury caused by such a 
violation—a SOX plaintiff is entitled to back pay and special damages upon proof of a 
violation, a SOX action sounds in tort and the jury-trial entitlement applies.     
 The final analogy, one which has instinctive intuitive appeal, is to qui tam actions 
available in eighteenth century-England.   During that period of time, the King’s Bench, 
an English common law court, had jurisdiction over common law writs of debt.206 Some 
of these writs of debt concerned qui tam actions—statutory causes of action by informers 
to recover statutorily imposed penalties.207 Apparently, English law had a statute similar 
to the False Claims Act, which allowed an informer to recover penalties on behalf of 
himself and the King for spotting and blowing the whistle on some sort of illegal 
activity.208 Such claims were tried at common law, presumably to juries.209 The analogy 
of the SOX action to these qui tam actions, which were brought as writs of debt at 
common law, is particularly well-founded.  The English qui tam actions compensated 
informers for reporting illegal activity.210 The SOX action protects the jobs of 
employees who report illegal activity and ultimately provides make-whole relief to those 
who suffer an adverse employment action for making such a report.211
The clearest eighteenth-century analogy to the SOX action is the qui tam action 
tried in the King’s Bench courts.  However, the historical evidence also supports the view 
that the modern-day SOX action is closely comparable to common-law breach of contract 
and tort actions, which were primarily tried to juries.  In any event, each one of these 
 
203 Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 727 (Scalia, J., concurring).
204 Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195 n.10; Del Montes Dunes, 526 U.S. at 715-19 (plurality), 727-731 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
205 See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 370 (1974) (“This Court has long assumed that . . .
actions for damages to a person or property . . . are actions at law triable to a jury”); Ross v. Bernhard, 396
U.S. 531, 533 (1970) (“The Seventh Amendment . . . entitles the parties to a jury trial in actions for
damages to a person or property . . .”); see e.g., Lebow v. American Trans Air, Inc., 86 F.3d 661, 669 (7th
Cir. 1996) (unlawful discharge suit under Railway Labor Act is comparable to common-law tort action);
Pandazides v. Virginia Board of Education, 13 F.3d 823, 829 (4th Cir. 1994) (Rehabilitation Act is
essentially a form of statutory tort).
206 Douglas King, Comment, Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial,
51 U. CHI. L. REV. 581, 598-99 (1984).
207 Id. at 599.
208 Id.
209 Examples of qui tam cases heard in King’s Bench include Shipman v. Henbest, 4 T.R. 109, 100 Eng.
Rep. 921 (K.B. 1790) (illicit sale of leather); Brooke v. Milliken, 3 T.R. 509, 100 Eng. Rep. 705 K.B. 1789)
(illicit sale of imported reprints of books originally written and published in the United Kingdom). See
King supra note 161 at n.100.
210 Id. at 599.
211 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.
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close analogies supports the contention that the Seventh Amendment preserves the right 
to jury trial on SOX whistleblower claims.    
2. The Nature of the Remedy 
 The second part of the historical test focuses on the nature of the relief sought.212
Is the SOX relief sought legal or equitable in nature? In other words, harkening back to 
the days of the divided bench, would the SOX remedies generally have been sought in the 
courts of law or in the courts of equity.213 In order to make such a determination, it is 
necessary to list the possible available remedies in a SOX action.  The SOX remedial 
scheme is designed to “make whole” the prevailing corporate whistleblower.214 The 
“make whole” relief includes reinstatement, back pay, special damages.215
The historical and conceptual evidence demonstrates that whereas reinstatement is 
an equitable remedy, back pay and special damages are legal remedies.  Thus, in a SOX 
case in federal court in which a plaintiff sues for reinstatement, back pay, and special 
damages, the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial because the plaintiff has 
asserted claims to legal remedies, back pay and special damages, even though an 
equitable remedy, reinstatement, is also asserted.  The fact that the right to equitable 
relief in the form of reinstatement is claimed does not vitiate the application of the jury 
right.  In Dairy Queen v. Wood, the Court ruled that when there are two remedies asserted 
in a case, one legal and one equitable, a jury trial is required as long as the right to the 
remedies turns on common issues of fact.216 The Court embraced the concept of a 
constitutionally-required jury trial on all factual issues presented by claims for legal 
relief, even if those issues also concerned claims for equitable relief and the equitable 
relief dominates the legal relief.217 The following part of the article elaborates on why 
SOX reinstatement is an equitable remedy, why SOX back pay and special damages are 
legal remedies, and why the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial in SOX 
whistleblower actions that seek back pay and special damages. 
a. SOX Reinstatement 
Relatively little time need be spent on the question of the reinstatement remedy, 
the answer of which has been alluded to in Part II.B. of the article.  Professor Dobbs 
 
212 See supra note 169.
213 Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-418 (1987) (citations omitted).
214 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(1) (“An employee prevailing in [a SOX action] shall be entitled to all relief
necessary to make the employee whole.”); KOHN, supra note 1 at 102 (“The heart of a SOX damage award
is a ‘make whole’ remedy. . . . Under the SOX, the ‘make whole’ remedy authorizes a court to award all
relief necessary to make an employee ‘whole.’”).
215 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2); KOHN, supra note 1 at 102.
216 369 U.S. 469 (1962); 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 6.10(5) at 225 (2d ed. 1993).
217
“ ‘[O]nly under the most imperative circumstances, circumstances which in view of the
flexible procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right to a jury
trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims.’ That
holding, of course, applies whether the trial judge chooses to characterize the legal issues
presented as ‘incidental’ to equitable issues or not.” Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S.
469, 472-73 (1962) (internal citations omitted).
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perfunctorily noted that reinstatement is “essentially injunctive relief.”218 Indeed, SOX 
suits in federal court to enforce preliminary reinstatement orders by the Department of 
Labor have been brought as suits for injunctive relief.219 It seems beyond dispute that 
the injunction is the quintessential equitable remedy from a historical standpoint.220
Moreover, the Supreme Court has made “clear that judgments compelling employment, 
reinstatement, or promotion are equitable.”221 Accordingly, the nature of the SOX 
reinstatement remedy is best characterized as an equitable one that historically was 
available in the courts of equity. 
b. SOX Back Pay 
The characterization of monetary remedies for Seventh Amendment purposes and 
for determining statutory authorization of relief has confounded the Supreme Court, the 
federal courts, and commentators for many years.222 In particular, the back pay remedy’s 
characterization has proven to confuse too many courts in too many contexts.223 But the 
confusion is unnecessary in the SOX context.  The SOX back pay remedy is simply a part 
of monetary compensation, i.e., a damages award, and is thus in the nature of legal 
relief.224 To explain why this is so requires a description of what SOX back pay 
comprises, an analysis of the nature of back pay and its history, an historical comparison 
of the SOX back pay remedy to other remedies at law, a refresher on the law of 
restitution, and an avoidance of Title VII cases which incorrectly characterize back pay as 
equitable.     
 SOX back pay is a substantial part of the SOX “make whole” remedial scheme.225
Its purpose is to restore the whistleblower to the same position he would have been in but 
for the illegal discharge or other illegal adverse employment action.226 It is measured by 
the difference between the actual earnings the whistleblower made from the time he first 
lost wages due to the illegal discharge to the date of judgment and those he would have 
earned absent the illegal discharge.227 Stated differently, a SOX back pay award should 
include all the compensation the whistleblower would have received but for the illegal 
firing—lost wages, raises, overtime compensation, bonuses, vacation pay, and retirement 
 
218 2 DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 6.10(5) at 226 (2d. ed. 1993).
219 See Bechtel v. Competitive Technologies, Inc., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 10926, 24 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA)
641 (2d Cir. 2006); Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., 407 F. Supp. 2d 773 (W.D. Va. 2006).
220 See supra note 116.
221 See supra note 116.
222 See Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 S.M.U. L. REV. 1577, 1607-28 (2002).
223 Id. at 1628-35.
224 See supra note 110.
225 KOHN, supra note 1 at 106 (“reinstatement and back pay are usually the two most significant elements
of a [SOX] ‘make whole’ remedy”).
226 Id at 105, quoting the basic black letter law concerning the calculation of whistleblower back pay from
Hobby v. Georgia Power Co., ALJ No. 1990-ERA-30, Recommended Decision and Order of ALJ, at 57
(internal citations omitted).
227 Id. at 106. See e.g., ABIGAIL MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 12.09 at 28 (3d ed.
1993) (“The backpay period normally covers the entire period during which plaintiff was precluded from
performing his or her job by the employer’s wrongful employment action, excluding periods during which
plaintiff would not have been earning wages.”); Welborn v. Reynolds Metal Co., 868 F.2d 389 (11th Cir.
1989); Walsdorf v. Board of Commissioners, 857 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1988).
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benefits.228 SOX back pay truly is compensation in the form of damages. A SOX back 
pay award is ultimately reflected in a money judgment.       
 Back pay did not exist as a common-law remedy.229 However, back pay is a 
standard remedy in many employment discrimination and whistleblower statutes.230 It is 
remedially similar to a contract claim for past wages due that would have been brought in 
a law court.231 Most importantly, SOX backpay is a form of compensatory damages 
because the award is measured by the whistleblower’s loss as opposed to the employer’s 
gain.232 Any remedy, like back pay, that is in the nature of compensatory damages is a 
legal remedy.233
A SOX back pay claim cannot fairly be categorized as restitutionary and thus 
equitable because back pay neither aims to prevent an employer’s unjust enrichment nor 
does it restore “in kind” a specific thing to the whistleblower.234 Without question some 
 
228 See RICHARD CARLSON, EMPLOYMENT LAW 992 (2005); Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 1333 (6th
Cir. 1988); Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1562 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 883 (1986).
229 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937); Millsap v. McDonnel Douglas
Corp., 368 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 2004).
230 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (upon a Title VII violation, the court may “order such affirmative action
as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees with
or without back pay . . . , or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.”); 5 U.S.C. §
1221(g)(1)(A) (under the Whistleblower Protection Act, a federal employee who is entitled to corrective
action under the WPA is to be “placed, as nearly as possible, in the position the individual would have been
in had the prohibited personnel practice not occurred.” The individual is also entitled to “back pay and
related benefits.”).
231 2 HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE, § 9.46 at 363-65 (4th ed. 1998);2
DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 6.10(5) at 226 (2d ed. 1993) (“Back pay claims do not differ remedially from
the personal injury claim for lost wages, or the contract claim for past wages due[.]”; Smith v. Diffee Ford-
Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 964 (10th Cir. 2002).
232 See Strayer supra note 30 at 825 (“With back pay, employees receive compensation for wages they
would have earned if they had been employed and also fringe benefits. . . . Back pay is not wrongfully
withheld wages; rather, it is damages for an employer’s breach of a duty it owed to an employee.”); 2
DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 6.10(5) at 227 n.15 (2d ed. 1993) (“Back pay might be considered
restitutionary if it were measured by the defendant’s gain rather than the plaintiff’s loss, that is, if it were
aimed at preventing unjust enrichment. But that is not the case; it is aimed at compensation and measured
by the plaintiff’s loss.”); Millsap, 368 F.3d at 1253 (“Backpay is compensatory because the award is
measured by an employee’s loss rather than an employer’s gain.”).
233 See supra note 110; Murphy supra note 222 at 1633 (“The back pay remedy is more appropriately
characterized as damages for plaintiffs losses and thus legal relief.”); Waldrop, 24 F.3d at 158 (“it has long
been the general rule that back wages are legal relief in the nature of compensatory damages.”); 2 DOBBS,
LAW OF REMEDIES, § 6.10(5) at 226 (2d. ed. 1993) (back pay is an ordinary damages claim, close to an
exemplar of a claim at law); 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.1-1.2 at 3, 11 (2d. ed. 1993) (“The
damages remedy is a money remedy aimed at making good the plaintiff’s losses. . . . The damages remedy
was historically a legal remedy.”); 1 ARTHUR G. SEDGWICK & JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE
MEASURE OF DAMAGES, § 3 at 3 (1920) (“equity . . . gives specific relief by decreeing the very thing to be
done which was agreed to be done . . . But, as a general rule, it refrains from awarding pecuniary reparation
for damage sustained.”).
234 The term “restitution” is generally viewed to mean recovery based on and measured by a defendant’s
unjust enrichment, see RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 comments a, d (1937); 1 GEORGE E. PALMER,
THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 2.10 at 140 (1978), and/or restoration in kind of a specific thing. See 1 DOBBS
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courts in employment discrimination suits have been led down the primrose path and 
have labeled back pay as restitutionary simply because back pay’s purpose is to restore 
the plaintiff to the original position he would have been in but for the wrongful 
employment decision.235 But, as many restitution scholars and courts have noted, that 
sort of an understanding of restitution is wrong because it destroys any conceptual 
distinction between compensatory damages and restitution.236 Moreover, even if a 
restitution characterization was appropriate, which it is not, that still would not render 
SOX back pay as equitable.237 Historically, restitution claims for money were asserted 
primarily in the courts of law, not the courts of equity, through the writ of assumpsit and 
standardized under the law of quasi-contract, a distinct species of common-law 
obligation.238 Back pay, at the very most, is a restitution claim for money which is best 
characterized as legal restitution, not equitable restitution.239
Federal court decisions concerning the characterization of Title VII back pay for 
Seventh Amendment purposes should not be heeded in the SOX back pay context for 
various reasons.  Although the Supreme Court has never specifically ruled on whether 
back pay under Title VII is legal or equitable for jury trial purposes240, the lower federal 
courts have routinely held that a jury trial is not guaranteed when a plaintiff seeks back 
 
LAW OF REMEDIES, § 4.1(1) at 551 (2d ed. 1993); see also Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of
Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1278-82 (1979). The Supreme Court is open to characterizing monetary
damages as equitable in cases where the damages are viewed as restitutionary—i.e, damages are being used
to prevent unjust enrichment. See Terry, 494 U.S. at 570-71; Tull, 481 U.S. at 424, Curtis, 415 U.S. at 197.
In Terry, the Court ruled that backpay in a breach of contract action against a union for violating a duty of
fair representation did not qualify as restitutionary because it did not seek to prevent unjust enrichment on
the part of the union. Terry, 494 U.S. at 570-71 (“The backpay sought by respondents is not money
wrongfully held by the Union, but wages and benefits they would have received from McLean had the
Union processed the employers’ grievances properly. Such relief is not restitutionary.”).
235 See, e.g., Schwartz v. Gregori, 45 F.3d 1017, 1022 (6th Cir. 1995) (backpay is restitutionary in that it
“operates to restore to the plaintiff that to which she would have enjoyed but for the employer’s illegal
retaliation.”).
236 Murphy supra note 222 at 1632; Laycock supra note 234 at 1282-83. See also In re Acushnet River &
New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Sup. 994, 1002 (D. Mass. 1989) (“Were the Court to accept the argument that
a monetary award is restitutionary simply because it returns a party to pre-injury status, little would be left
in the realm of compensatory damages.”).
237 See 2 DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, § 6.10(5) at 227 (2d. ed. 1993) (“[I]t is said that back pay is not legal
after all, but is equitable because it is restitutionary. This point appears to be doubly wrong, since a claim
does not become equitable by being restitutionary.”).
238 See Murphy supra note 222 at 1632 (“[M]ost restitutionary claims for money were asserted in the law
courts.”); 1 DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, § 1.2, 11, § 4.1(1), 556, § 4.2, 570-586 (2d ed. 1993) (“Restitution
claims for money are usually ‘claims at law’); 2 DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, § 6.10(5), 227 n.15 (2d ed.
1993) (“Restitution claims at law include all the quasi-contract claims based on assumpsit, such as those
based on common counts like money had and received and quantum meruit.”); FREDERIC WOODWARD, THE
LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS, § 2, 2-4 (1913); Moses v. MacFerlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B.
1760).
239 See, e.g., Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., 126 S. C. 1869 (2006); Great-West Life &
Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) (distinguishing between restitutionary relief available at
law and restitutionary relief available in equity).
240 See Murphy supra note 222 at 1629 (“in cases between Terry and Great-West, the Supreme Court has
expressly stated that it has not yet decided whether back pay under Title VII is legal or equitable for jury
trial purposes.”)
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pay under Title VII.241 Many of these courts rationalized that the specific language in 
Title VII’s remedial provision242 demonstrated that Congress considered back pay as 
equitable under Title VII in that back pay was just an “integral part of the statutory 
equitable remedy” or “only incidental” to equitable relief provided by the statute.243 The 
notion that Title VII back pay is equitable was argued to be supported by the historical 
equitable clean-up doctrine—that is in certain cases when the Chancellor issued an 
equitable remedy, such as an injunction, he could award money if it was incidental to the 
equitable remedy.244 Some courts also intimated that Title VII back pay was an equitable 
remedy because the Title VII remedial language arguably provided discretion to the 
courts as to the availability of back pay.245
The Title VII back pay rationalization has no business guiding future courts 
concerning the characterization of SOX back pay for several reasons.  First, the Seventh 
Amendment historical analysis would be of little use if courts give a blank check to 
Congress to characterize remedies in such a way as to defeat the protections of the 
Seventh Amendment.246 If the Title VII cases are followed, Congress could label any 
sort of remedy an equitable remedy, even if it is undisputed that the remedy was 
historically a legal remedy, and thus bypass the Seventh Amendment.  Second, and in any 
event, the SOX remedial provision is vastly different from the Title VII.  In no way does 
the language reflect Congressional determination that back pay is equitable.247 To the 
contrary, back pay is labeled as a part of compensatory damages.248 Third, for good 
 
241 See 2 DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, § 6(10)5, 226 n.10 (2d. ed. 1993) (listing courts of appeals cases
rejecting jury trials on Title VII claims).
242 See supra note 230.
243 See Stephen F. Lazor, Comment, Jury Trial in Employment Discrimination Cases—Constitutionally
Mandated?, 53 TEX. L. REV. 483, 485, 500 (1974); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d
1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969).
244 See 1 POMEROY, supra note 110 §§ 231-242 (describing when equitable-clean up doctrine applied); 1
DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, § 2.6(4), 169, § 2.7, 180 (2d. ed. 1993) (discussing equitable clean-up
doctrine), A. Leo Levin, Equitable Clean-Up and the Jury: A Suggested Orientation, U PA. L. REV. 320,
320-31 (1951) (same); Harkless v. Sweeney Independent Sch. Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1970)
(back pay is an integral part of the remedy of injunctive reinstatement and so no jury right attaches).
245 See 2 DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, § 6.10(5), 228 (2d. ed. 1993); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 442-43 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
246 Concerning his suggestion that the historical test is not the best reading of the Seventh Amendment,
Professor Akhil Reed Amar argues that the core of the Seventh Amendment was directed at the states, not
Congress, in part, because “a Congress bent on evading civil juries could draft statutes sounding in equity,
not law.” AMAR, supra note 179 at 92. Amar’s insight—that the jury right could be malleable based on
Congressional labeling—is certainly a concern. If the historical test is to have any bite whatsoever,
however, courts must be sensitive to unhistorical Congressional labeling intended to defeat the jury right,
even if the rationale underlying the Congressional action could be viewed as beneficent. For example, fear
of jury prejudice after the passage of Title VII has been viewed as a pragmatic reason why the courts
refused to grant jury trials in Title VII cases. See Lazor supra note 243 at 506-07.
247 The SOX statute lists reinstatement, back pay, and special damages under compensatory damages, but
the legislative history indicates that reinstatement, back pay, and compensatory damages, i.e., non-
economic damages, are separate remedies. Although the statute lists reinstatement under compensatory
damages, reinstate is clearly an equitable remedy. The statute does not specifically state whether back pay
is legal or equitable.
248 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2). Once again, although the statute list back pay under compensatory
damages, the legislative history indicates that back pay and compensatory damages are separate remedies.
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reason, the idea that the equitable clean-up doctrine can be used to prevent a truly legal 
claim from being tried to a jury has been soundly rejected by the Supreme Court due to 
the merger of law and equity in the federal courts.249 Stretched to its outermost limits, 
the equitable clean-up doctrine would gobble up all cases in which legal and equitable 
remedies are asserted in the same action, even when the legal and equitable remedies are 
independent and equally important to the plaintiff, which severely encroaches on the jury 
trial guarantee.250 Finally, the suggestion that the discretionary nature of a remedy due to 
Congressional action makes it “equitable” in the sense that the remedy could only have 
been brought in the courts of equity is unpersuasive.251 While it is true that the hallmark 
of equity is the discretion given to the Chancellor, this general principle hardly means 
Congress should have the power to take a legal remedy and make it equitable by imbuing 
the remedy with discretion.252 Regardless, Congress did not imbue the SOX back pay 
remedy with such discretion.  If a plaintiff proves unlawful retaliation and lost wages, he 
is entitled to back pay.253
c. SOX Special Damages 
 SOX provides “compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the 
discrimination, including litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney’s 
fees.”254 The “special damages” relief falls under the heading of “COMPENSATORY 
DAMAGES.”255 Part II.B. argues that the terms “compensatory damages” and “special 
damages” in the SOX remedial provision should be interpreted to include damages to 
reputation, emotional distress damages, and other non-pecuniary damages.  The argument 
sprung from an analysis of other federal whistleblower laws—AIR 21, ERA, and the 
FCA, each of which allow for recovery of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages 
 
249 Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469,
470-73 (1962); Setser v. Novack Investment Co., 638 F.2d 1137, 1141 (8th Cir. 1981), opinion vacated on
other grounds, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064 (1981) (“the judicial analysis that has construed backpay as
incidental to reinstatement appears to be the theoretical equivalent of the repudiated ‘clean-up’ doctrine in
equity.”).
250 SOX reinstatement and back pay are listed as separate kinds of the overall relief of “Compensatory
Damages” and thus are not intertwined for Seventh Amendment purposes. The statute states that a
prevailing plaintiff “shall” be entitled to reinstatement, back pay, and special damages upon a violation. It
appears conceivable that in any one SOX action not all remedies will be available. However,
reinstatement, or at least front pay, and back pay appear to be “automatic” remedies in almost all SOX
actions in which the complainant or plaintiff prevails. See KOHN, supra note 1 at 104-05. It looks as
though many SOX cases will arise in which the potential back pay award is extremely large and as such
will be hard to view as “incidental” to the reinstatement remedy. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS
(BNA), INC., Split Second Circuit Rejects Enforcement By Court of Preliminary SOX Reinstatement,
DAILY LABOR REPORT, No. 86, May 4, 2006, Page AA-1 (OSHA investigatory issued a preliminary
reinstatement order as well as approximately $350,000 to complainant for losses and costs resulting from
the wrongful termination).
251 See 2 DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, § 6.10(5), 228 (2d ed. 1993).
252 See Doug Rendleman, Chapters of the Civil Jury, 65 KY. L. J. 769, 775-76 (1977) (stating that
conditioning the right to a jury trial on whether a monetary remedy is discretionary is a “novel and
aberrant” view and should be discarded).
253 See supra Part II.A..
254 Id.
255 Id.
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listed above under the umbrella of either “compensatory” or “special” damages.256 The 
argument is consistent with the common law meaning of “special damages,”257 which 
Congress is presumed to have intended,258 and SOX’s stated policy to provide “make 
whole” relief to prevailing whistleblowers.259 Thus, special and compensatory damages 
in the form of emotional distress damages and reputational damages are available under 
SOX. These damages qualify as legal relief, not equitable relief, because they 
traditionally have been associated with the law courts and determined by juries.260
The nature of the SOX action and remedial provision demonstrate that the 
Seventh Amendment preserves the right to jury trial on certain SOX claims.  The SOX 
action is most analogous to historical forms of action that were brought in the law 
courts.261 The SOX remedies are split between legal and equitable remedies.  SOX 
reinstatement is an equitable remedy.262 SOX back pay, emotional distress damages, 
reputational damages, and other compensatory/special damages are legal remedies.263
Thus, when a SOX plaintiff asserts in his original complaint in federal court that he seeks 
reinstatement, back pay, and special damages for emotional distress, or merely 
reinstatement and back pay, the action asserts legal remedies such that the right to a jury 
trial attaches as to all issues concerning the legal remedies even though an equitable issue 
is also present in the form of a request for injunctive relief.264 The following describes 
the functions of the judge and the jury in this scenario. 
 
256 See supra Part II.B.
257 General damages are those that naturally flow from the civil violation in question. In contrast, special
damages are those that, although flowing from the wrong, are unusual for the type of claim in question.
See 2 JAMES WM. MOORE, ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 9.08[1][a] (1997); Avita v. Metropolitan
Club of Chicago, 49 F.3d 1219, 1226 (7th Cir. 1995); CHARLES MCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
DAMAGES, § 8, 33 (1935). Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(g) requires a plaintiff to specifically plead “special damages.”
In the SOX context, lost wages in the form of back pay are general damages because they are normal in
wrongful discharge cases, emotional distress damages and reputational damages are special damages
because they are not the run-of-the-mill damages in wrongful discharge cases.
258 It is a longstanding principle of statutory construction that Congress intends to adopt the common-law
definition of a statutory term unless otherwise stated. See United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 491
(1997); United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 13 (1994); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S.
318, 322 (1992); Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952); Bohac v. Dep’t of Agriculture, 239
F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
259 Compensatory damages are intended to make the injured party completely whole. See KOHN, supra
note 1 at 108. In wrongful discharge/whistleblower cases, compensatory damages have included
compensation for “emotional distress, pain and suffering, mental anguish, lost future earnings capacity . . .
harassment, humiliation, loss of professional reputation, ostracism.” Id. See also HENRY H. PERITT, JR.,
EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE, § 5.33, 319 (2nd ed. 1987) (“courts have awarded
compensatory damages for the tort of wrongful dismissal which include lost earnings, lost future earnings,
expenses of finding a new job, and mental anguish.”); Hanna v. WCI Communities, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d
1332, 1334 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (damages for reputational injury available under SOX).
260 See supra note 110.
261 See supra Part III.A.1.
262 See supra Part III.A.2.a.
263 See supra Part III.A.2.b.-c.
264 See WRIGHT & MILLER supra note 112 § 2308, 82.
The Supreme Court now has made it wholly clear that a claim that otherwise would be
triable to a jury must be so tried even though it may be thought “incidental” to a claim for
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3. Allocating the Functions of Judge and Jury 
The fact that the jury right attaches to a SOX action in federal district court does 
not mean that the jury will hear every issue that may arise in the case.265 The Del Monte 
Dunes and Markman cases elaborate on how to determine which issues must go to the 
jury in order to preserve the substance of the jury right.266 The preference is to once 
again engage in a historical analysis, comparing the modern issue to an analogous issue 
that existed in 1791 when history is clear as to whom decided the older issue—the judge 
or jury.267 However, if history does not supply an answer, existing precedent and 
functional considerations guide the determination.268 In the absence of an exact 
historical analogue, the key to determining which SOX issues go to the judge and which 
go to the jury is to focus on the distinction between fact questions and legal questions.269
In general, the Seventh Amendment desires to ensure that juries decide questions of fact 
and judges decide questions of law.270
An historical analysis sheds some light on which SOX issues must be decided by 
the jury to preserve the substance of the Seventh Amendment right.  English juries in the 
late 18th-century assessed both economic and, at times, non-economic damages because 
damages assessments were primarily fact-based determinations.271 Accordingly, the 
amount of back pay, reputational damages, and mental anguish damages in a SOX action 
ought to be determined by a jury.  The SOX liability questions, however, have no exact 
counterparts and therefore a historical analysis concerning these issues is more difficult.   
 In general, the SOX action is analogous to breach of implied contract, tort, and 
qui tam claims272, which were brought in the English common law courts, but the 
 
an injunction. The order of trial must be arranged so that any issues common to the legal
claim and the claim for an injunction are tried to a jury at the outset, with the court
thereafter resolving any purely equitable issues in the case.
265 Del Monte, 526 U.S. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“To say that the respondents had the right to a jury
trial on their § 1983 claim is not to say that they were entitled to have the jury decide every issue. The
precise scope of the jury’s function is the second Seventh Amendment issue before us here . . . .”).
266 Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 718-23, 731-32; Markman, 517 U.S. at 377-91.
267 Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 718; Markman, 517 U.S. at 378.
268 Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 718; Markman, 517 U.S. at 384.
269 Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 720 (“In actions at law predominantly factual issues are in most cases
allocated to the jury”); Id. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring) (favoring a methodology, which, if history does
not supply an answer, recognizes the historical preference for juries to make factual determinations and for
judges to decide legal questions)
270 See Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (Seventh Amendment aims “to
retain the common-law distinction between the province of the court and that of the jury, whereby, in the
absence of express or implied consent to the contrary, issues of law are to be resolved by the court and
issues of fact are to be determined by the jury . . . .”). See also Walker v. New Mexico & So. Pac. R. Co.,
165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897); Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 497-99 (1931);
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476, 485-86 (1935).
271 See Colleen P. Murphy, Determining Compensation: The Tension Between Legislative Power and
Jury Authority, 74 TEX. L. REV. 345, 360 (1995); Clinton W. Francis, The Structure of Judicial
Administration and the Development of Contract Law in Seventeenth-Century England, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
35, 64 (1983); George T. Washington, Damages in Contract at Common Law, 47 LAW Q. REV. 345, 354-
56, 364-66 (1931); Scott v. Sheperd, 95 Eng. Rep. 1124 (K.B. 1773).
272 See supra Part III.A.1.
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elements of a SOX claim—protected conduct, employer knowledge of protected conduct, 
adverse personnel action, and causation273—are not easily identifiable with elements of 
the old common law forms of action that were precursors to modern-day contract and tort 
claims.  Moreover, even when a possible historical tort or contract counterpart to a SOX 
liability question exists, it is often difficult to discern whether the historical issue was one 
for the jury or the judge at English common law.  For example, while causation in 
modern-day negligence law and causation in SOX might be viewed as similar concepts, 
the concept of causation in the common law actions of trespass and case was decidedly 
different from a present-day understanding of causation.274 At English common law, 
causation was essentially a question of directness—“whether the defendant had directly 
done the harm.”275 It seems likely that as a practical matter English juries considered 
questions of “directness” in trespass and case276, especially given the practice of 
confining jury questions to a single question of fact277 and the oftentimes lack of a clear 
separation between fact and law278, however, the historical evidence suggests that the test 
of directness had become a rule of law by the last quarter of the eighteenth century.279
Perhaps the closest historical analogue to a SOX issue is whether an English qui tam 
plaintiff reported illegal activity.280 This issue is similar to the protected conduct inquiry 
under SOX.  It is likely that an English jury decided whether the qui tam plaintiff 
reported illegal activity in a qui tam action brought as a writ of debt, which would tend to 
indicate that the SOX protected activity issue is a jury question.281
The historical inquiry, while useful, does not provide a clear answer as to which 
SOX issues must be tried to the jury.  Therefore, my eyes also turn toward the 
characterization of various issues as either legal or factual under current whistleblower 
and employment discrimination laws and the policy reasons why a jury, as opposed to a 
judge, should decide a particular SOX issue.282 This pragmatic search indicates that 
SOX issues can in most cases be properly delineated as either legal questions for the 
judge or factual questions for the jury. 
 The SOX employee protection provision prohibits a covered employer from 
discriminating against a covered employee for providing information or assisting in 
investigations concerning fraud against shareholders.283 SOX actions are governed by 
the legal burdens of proof established in the AIR 21 Act.284 As previously alluded, a 
SOX plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:  (1) he engaged in 
 
273 See infra Part III.A.3.
274 See S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW, 392-400 (2d ed. 1981)
275 Id. at 395.
276 Id. at 396-97.
277 See Francis, supra note 271 at 68-73.
278 See Washington, supra note 271 at 346.
279 See MILSOM, supra note 274 at 397.
280 See supra Part III.A.1.
281 See supra note 198.
282 Id. at 384 (when the historical analysis yields no discernible conclusion, consider precedent, the relative
interpretive skills of judges and juries, and the statutory policies that should be furthered by the allocation
in determining whether to allocate an issue to the judge or jury for Seventh Amendment purposes).
283 See supra note 11.
284 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (West 2005); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C).
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protected conduct; (2) the employer knew he engaged in protected conduct; (2) he 
suffered an unfavorable personnel action; and (4) the protected conduct was a 
contributing factor in the unfavorable action.285 An employer can avoid liability by 
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same 
unfavorable personnel action in the absence of the protected conduct.286 These four 
elements and the employer’s affirmative defense are the heart of a SOX action.  They are 
primarily factual issues to be decided by a jury.  In contrast, there are numerous issues in 
a SOX action that are essentially legal questions that must be resolved by a judge.  The 
jury has no role to play in deciding such questions. 
a. SOX Questions of Law 
In part due to the unique two-tiered enforcement system established by the statute, 
administrative law judges, administrative appeals judges, and federal judges confront 
challenging legal questions under the SOX statute.  These include, but are not limited to, 
jurisdictional questions, coverage questions, procedural questions, evidentiary questions, 
and constitutional questions.287 For example, judges have ruled on whether the statute 
operates retroactively288, the effect of filing a SOX complaint in federal district court on 
the jurisdiction of the administrative law judge in the administrative proceeding289,
whether the statute applies extraterritorially290, whether a non-publicly traded subsidiary 
of a publicly traded parent company is a covered employer291, the applicability of the 
attorney-client privilege in a particular case292, the propriety of economic reinstatement 
or front pay in lieu of reinstatement293, and whether the right to jury trial is guaranteed by 
the statute or Constitution.294 These are just a sample of the legal questions that have 
already been addressed by judges.  Judges will have to rule on many more legal questions 
in the future.  As a general principle, the interpretive questions posed by the statute 
concerning jurisdiction, coverage, procedure, and evidence are legal questions to be 
resolved by judges.295 The Seventh Amendment does not have any impact on these 
questions. 
 
285 49 U.S.C. § 42121(a)-(b)(2)(B)(iii)-(iv); Collins v. Beazer Homes, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1375 (N.D.
Ga. 2004); Reddy v. Medquist, Inc., ARB No. 04-123, ALJ No. 2004-SOX-35, slip op. at 7 (ARB
September 30, 2005); Getman v. Southwest Securities, Inc., ARB No. 04-059, ALJ No. 2003-SOX-8, slip
op. at 8 (ARB July 29, 2005);
286 Id.
287 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) Whistleblower Digest, U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Administrative
Law Judges, available online at http://www.oalj.gov.
288 McIntyre v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 2003-SOX-23, slip op. at 7 (ALJ Jan. 16,
2004).
289 Stone v. Duke Energy Corp., 432 F.3d 320, 323 (4th Cir. 2005).
290 Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 7-18 (1st Cir. 2005).
291 Bothwell v. American Income Life, 2005-SOX-57 (ALJ Sept. 19, 2005).
292 Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., 2003-SOX-15, slip. op. at 2 (ALJ Aug. 15, 2003).
293 Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., ARB No. 06-062, ALJ No. 2003-SOX-15 (ARB June 9, 2006).
294 Murray v. TXU Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10945, 2005 WL 135644, 86 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH),
P41, 981 (N.D. Tex. 2005).
295 Professor Kirgis, an outstanding scholar, has recently examined the aspect of Seventh Amendment
jurisprudence of concern in Part III.A.3 of this article: how to allocate particular questions to the judge or
jury in a case where the right to jury trial exists. See Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a Jury Decision on
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b. SOX Questions of Fact and Mixed Questions of Fact and Law 
In contrast, whether the elements of a SOX action have been proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence and damages determinations are generally fact questions 
for the jury.296 With respect to the SOX elements, the way in which statutory elements in 
other areas of employment law have been characterized by courts is insightful.   Federal 
employment retaliation law, whistleblower statutes, and First Amendment retaliation law 
correctly treat causation and the employer’s knowledge of protected conduct as factual 
issues for the jury if sufficient evidence is presented on these elements.297
Questions of Fact Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L. J. 1125 (2003). Professor Kirgis argues
that the fact-law distinction should guide courts in determining the questions that must go to the jury and
proposes an inferential analysis for distinguishing “fact” questions that must go to the jury from other
questions that should be decided by the judge. Id. at 1130. Under this test, “[a] question of fact is one that
requires for its answer inductive inferences about the transactions or occurrences in dispute.” Id. at 1158.
In contrast, a question of law calls “for either deductive inferences or inductive inferences leading to
conclusions beyond the transactions or occurrences in dispute.” Id at 1130. I will examine Kirgis’
inferential test, which I find illuminating, later in this article.
Kirgis’ inferential account of the fact-law distinction correctly presupposes that most decisions made
during the litigation process are simply outside the realm of the jury even though those decisions require
the decision-maker, i.e., the judge, to make certain “factual” findings. Id. at 1145-46. Kirgis describes this
as the judicial screening function and defines a screening decision as any decision that entails “regulating
the actions of the parties to ensure that the adjudicative process unfolds in a way that comports with
systemic norms.” Id. at 1146. He notes that “judicial screening” questions are often referred to by courts
as questions of “law,” but that such description is a “matter of convention rather than as a counterpoint to
decisions of ‘fact.’” Id. There are three basic types of judicial screening questions which are outside the
province of the jury: (1) questions addressing the propriety of the chosen forum (e.g., jurisdictional
questions); (2) questions about what data/information can be considered by the decision-maker (e.g.,
evidentiary questions); and (3) questions about whether a particular question can be posed to the decision-
maker (e.g., the propriety of submitting a proposed jury question). Id. at 1147-1153.
The SOX questions concerning jurisdiction, coverage, procedure, and evidence, which are set forth
above, fit within the judicial screening function described by Professor Kirgis and may not be decided by a
jury.
296 The Seventh Amendment does not prevent the use of procedural devices such as a motion for summary
judgment or a motion for judgment as a matter of law to dismiss SOX actions which do not have sufficient
evidentiary proof on each SOX element. See e.g., Baltimore & Carolina, 295 U.S. 654, 656-60 (U.S. 1935)
(sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law for the court). As in other federal employment
retaliation/discrimination cases, whether a SOX case gets to the jury depends on the quality and amount of
evidence introduced during the summary judgment stage and/or during trial, even if, as a general
proposition, the determination as to whether a SOX plaintiff proved an element of his cause of action is a
factual determination. A determination by a judge that a case can only be decided one way does not violate
the Seventh Amendment. See e.g., Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 127 (3d Cir. 2005); Kirgis, supra
note 239, at 1151-52; Ellen E. Seward, The Seventh Amendment and the Alchemy of Fact and Law, 33
SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 592-632 (2003).
297 See King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d 887, 894 (7th Cir. 1999) (fact question for jury
existed on whether employer terminated plaintiff’s employment for legitimate, non-retaliatory reason or
because of plaintiff’s use of FMLA leave); Bechtel Construction Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 50 F.3d 926,
933 (11th Cir. 1995) (the Secretary of Labor’s determination as to whether an ERA-whistleblower was
fired for engaging in protected activity or for legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is an adjudicative,
factual finding that must be supported by substantial evidence); Curinga v. City of Clairton, 357 F.3d 305,
310 (3d Cir. 2004) (whether constitutionally protected speech was a motivating factor in the discharge is a
question of fact); Gordon v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, (2d Cir. 2002) (“A jury, however,
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Retaliation cases conflict on whether the protected conduct inquiry is a question 
of fact or law.  Most courts interpret the “opposition” clause of the Title VII retaliation 
provision to require the employee to demonstrate that he had a “reasonable belief” that 
the employer engaged in unlawful employment practices in order to prove protected 
conduct.298 The employee’s “reasonable belief” is viewed objectively, but the plaintiff 
does not have to prove that the opposed conduct in fact violated Title VII.299 The 
“reasonable belief” standard appears to provide considerable room for a fact-finder to 
make a determination as to whether an employee engaged in protected conduct under 
Title VII, but many courts view whether actions constitute protected conduct under Title 
VII as questions of law.300 Similarly, in First Amendment retaliation claims, whether 
speech is constitutionally protected is uniformly regarded as a question of law for the 
court.301
Recent Supreme Court authority suggests that the adverse employment action 
element under Title VII is best viewed as a question of fact.  The scope of the adverse 
employment action element of Title VII retaliation law has varied widely among the 
circuits until recently.302 In Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company v. 
White, the Court held that the Title VII retaliation provision covers only those employer 
actions that would have been “materially adverse” to a reasonable employee or job 
 
can find [Title VII] retaliation even if the [corporate] agent denies direct knowledge of a plaintiff’s
protected activities, for example, so long as the jury finds that the circumstances evidence knowledge of the
protected activities or the jury concludes that an agent is acting explicitly or implicit upon the order of a
superior who has the requisite knowledge.”); Clements v. Airport Authority of Washoe County, 69 F.3d
321, 334 (9th Cir. 1995) (conflicting evidence raised fact issue sufficient to deny summary judgment as to
whether decision-maker knew of employee’s First Amendment protected whistle-blowing activity).
298 See Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1140 (5th Cir. 1981).
299 See Byers v. The Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 428 (5th Cir. 2000).
300 Compare George v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31195, *11 (N.D. Tex.
December 5, 2005) (plaintiff’s summary-judgment evidence was sufficient for a jury to find that the
plaintiff reasonable believed the complained of conduct was unlawful and thus a fact issue existed as to
whether opposition constituted protected activity) with Barnes v. Small, 840 F.3d 972, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(protected activity determination is a question of law because it is largely based on an interpretation of Title
VII); Broderick v. Donaldson, 338 F. Supp. 2d 30, 41 (D.D.C. 2004) (“the determination as to whether the
memorandum is protected activity is a question of law because it relies on an interpretation of Title VII”);
Carter-Obayuwana v. Howard University, 764 A.2d 779, 790 (D.C. 2001) (“[w]hether actions by an
employee constitute protected activity [under Title VII] is a question of law”). See also Bechtel
Construction Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 50 F.3d 926, 931 (11th Cir. 1995) (whether general inquiries
regarding safety constitute protected activity under whistleblower protection provisions of the Energy
Reorganization Act is a question of law to be reviewed on a de novo basis); Heckmann v. Detroit Chief of
Police, 705 N.W.2d 689, 698 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (whether plaintiff engaged in protected activity under
Michigan Whistleblower Protection Act presents a question of law).
301 See Curinga v. City of Clairton, 357 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2004); Horstkoetter v. Dep’t of Public
Safety, 159 F.3d 1265, 1271 (10th Cir. 1998); Orange v. District of Columbia, 59 F.3d 1267, 1272 (D.C.
Cir. 1995); Hatcher v. Board of Public Education, 809 F.2d 1546, 1556 (11th Cir. 1987).
302 See Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. __ , __ (2006); Joel A. Kravetz,
Deterence v. Material Harm: Finding the Appropriate Standard to Define an “Adverse Action” in
Retaliation Claims Brought Under the Applicable Equal Employment Opportunity Statutes, 4 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 315, 321-55 (2001-2002); Melissa A. Essary and Terence D. Friedman, Retaliation Claims
Under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA: Untouchable Employees, Uncertain Employers, Unresolved
Courts, 63 MO. L. REV. 115, 134-139 (1998).
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applicant.303 The Court upheld a jury’s verdict that a reassignment to more onerous job 
duties and a 37-day suspension without pay constituted retaliation under this standard.304
The White Court’s opinion contemplates that it is for the fact-finder, i.e., the jury, to 
determine whether an employer’s actions constitute retaliation when sufficient evidence 
exists for a reasonable jury to conclude that the employer’s action would be materially 
adverse to a reasonable employee. 
 The SOX elements should generally be viewed as factual determinations to be 
made by a SOX jury.  Like Title VII law, the causation and employer’s knowledge of 
protected conduct elements in SOX actions are pure factual determinations to be made by 
a jury when conflicting evidence is presented by employee and employer.305 The 
characterization of the SOX protected conduct element is trickier.  It is similar to the Title 
VII protected conduct element in that a SOX plaintiff need only prove he had a 
“reasonable belief” that he engaged in protected activity.306 However, it is more 
appropriate for a juror to determine whether someone “reasonably believed” the 
employer committed a Title VII violation than whether someone “reasonably believed” 
the employer violated securities laws or other laws that protected fraud against 
shareholders.  Both determinations require an understanding of what actions in fact may 
violate the law (or at least what actions could conceivably fall within the scope of those 
laws) and to some degree involve considerations of credibility.307 The credibility 
 
303 White, 548 U.S. at __ .
304 White, 548 U.S. at __ .
305 Under Professor Kirgis’ inferential test for determining a question of fact as distinguished from a
question of law, when a question involves inductive inferences it is a question of fact that must be resolved
by the jury under the Seventh Amendment. My characterization of the causation and employer’s
knowledge of protected conduct elements as questions of fact to be resolved by the jury is consistent with
Kirgis’ description of the basic types of factual conclusions jurors in circumstances that require inductive
reasoning. Kirgis states:
At least for purposes of adjudication, inductive reasoning may be used to reach 
conclusions of three basic types:  that an event or condition in the past or present 
probably has occurred or is occurring; that an event or condition in the future probably 
will occur; or that a hypothetical event or condition probably would occur given some 
postulated set of circumstances, a type of reasoning known as the counterfactual 
conditional.  The phrase “events or conditions” in these formulations is intended to 
encompass virtually all phenomena in the world, including the identity of things or 
persons, the occurrence of physical events or human acts, mental states, and relations of 
cause and effect. Kirgis, supra note 295 at 1155 (emphasis added).  
 Whether (and at what time) an employer knew that an employee engaged in activity alleged to be 
SOX-protected activity falls within Kirgis’ first type of inductive-reasoning conclusions because it 
concerns a determination regarding an actual historical event or condition derived from inferences and the 
judgment of witnesses’ credibility.  Id. at 1155.  Whether an employee’s SOX-protected activity was a 
contributing factor in the adverse employment action suffered by the employee, and/or whether the 
employer would have taken the same employment action regardless of the protected activity is a causation 
question of the third type described by Kirgis because it requires a probabilistic inference based on the 
circumstances surrounding the employee’s employment situation and the actual personnel decision.  Id. at 
1157 (“In their focus on the likely course of events, both questions of but-for cause and questions of 
proximate cause require probabilistic inferences about hypothetical conditions in the world—the events that 
were most likely to happen given the state of the world prior to the injury.”).          
306 Reddy v. Medquist, Inc., ARB No. 04-123, ALJ No. 2004-SOX-35, slip op. at 8 (ARB Sept. 30, 2005).
307 See e.g., Tuttle v. Johnson Controls Battery Division, 2004-SOX-76, slip op. at 3-4 (ALJ Jan. 3, 2005)
(employee’s claim that he reasonably believed the employer violated one of the laws or regulations
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judgments, however, are dependent on one’s knowledge of what could possibly violate or 
impact the underlying substantive law—Title VII or the various federal laws prohibiting 
fraud against shareholders.  It could be argued that the protected conduct determination is 
better suited to the common-sense of the jury if it is believed that the jury intuitively 
understands or can be quickly educated on the fundamental tenets of Title VII 
antidiscrimination law.308 But, given the complexities of the mail fraud, wire fraud, radio 
fraud, TV fraud, bank fraud, and securities fraud statutes, as well as other federal laws 
relating to fraud against shareholders, it would seem as though in most cases a trained 
specialist, the judge, would be the better actor to determine whether particular employee 
actions constitute protected activity under SOX.309 The policy-oriented and complexity 
aspects of whether a SOX plaintiff engaged in protected conduct indicates the protected 
conduct determination is best viewed as mixed question of fact and law to be resolved by 
a jury or judge depending on the individual circumstances of the particular case at hand, 
but typically by the judge.310
enumerated in SOX whistleblower statute must be scrutinized under both subjective and objective
standards).
308 See, e.g., Markman, 517 U.S. 389-90.
309 Professor Kirgis’ article elaborates on the difficulties courts and commentators have encountered in
determining whether questions of reasonableness are questions of fact for the jury or questions of law for
the judge. He explains that such determination varies with the type of reasonableness question at issue.
For example, the question of negligence in a civil case has historically been viewed as one for the jury. In
contrast, in malicious prosecution cases, the question whether a person had a “reasonable belief” that
another committed a crime is reserved for the judge. Kirgis, supra note 295, at 1162-70. Kirgis reconciles
this apparent discrepancy through the lens of his inferential account of the fact-law distinction by noting
that determining reasonableness in a negligence case involves making inductive inferences about the nature
of the defendant’s conduct, whereas determining whether a person had a reasonable belief in the guilt of
another does not require such inferences. Id. at 1169 (“A decision maker tasked with making that decision
[whether a person had a reasonable belief that another committed a crime] needs nothing but his own sense
of how to characterize events in the world. The decision maker simply compares the apparent conduct of
the accused with the decision maker’s storehouse of knowledge about what constitutes apparent criminal
conduct.”).
The question of whether an employee had a “reasonable belief” that his employer violated any federal
law concerning fraud against shareholders is similar to the malicious prosecution question in that it does
not involve any inductive inferences. Once it is determined what the alleged SOX-protected plaintiff
complained about, it is simply up to the decision maker to compare the alleged fraudulent conduct with the
decision maker’s “storehouse of knowledge” about what could conceivably constitute fraud against
shareholders under the various federal laws. Due to the complexities of these federal fraud laws, a federal
judge is likely better equipped than a juror to make such a decision.
310 Compare Getman v. Southwest Securities, Inc., ARB No. 04-059, ALJ No. 2003-SOX-8, slip op. at 9
(ARB July 29, 2005) (whether equity research analyst’s “refusal” to raise her stock rating during a review
committee meeting constituted protected activity is a legal question) and Harvey v. Home Depot USA, Inc.,
ARB Nos. 04-114 and 115, ALJ Nos. 04-SOX-20 and 04-SOX-36, USDOL/OALJ REPORTER at 14 (ARB
June 2, 2006) (dismissing SOX action for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted because
complainant’s letters sent to the company’s Board of Directors and Executives, which informed
management about questionable personnel practices, corporate expenditures with which the employee
disagreed, and possible FMLA and FLSA violations, did not constitute SOX-protected activity) with Reddy
v. Medquist, Inc., ARB No. 04-123, ALJ No. 2004-SOX-35, slip op. at 7-8 (ARB Sept. 30, 2005) (ALJ’s
finding that complainant did not engage in protected activity is conclusive if supported by substantial
evidence) and Collins, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1377, 1380 (upon employer’s motion for summary judgment, the
court found that genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether SOX plaintiff engaged in protected
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The characterization of the SOX adverse employment action is nuanced as well.  
The adverse employment action determination lies somewhere between the pure factual 
determination of the causation element and the mixed question of fact and law 
determination of the protected conduct element.  It is an open question how 
“unfavorable” the employment action must be to fall within the scope of the SOX anti-
retaliation provision.  Does the “materially adverse” standard from White govern, or 
should either a broader or stricter standard control?311 Regardless of the standard 
adopted, the determination as to whether this SOX element is proven by a preponderance 
of the evidence should generally be one for the jury.  Jurors should, of course, be charged 
on the proper standard, whatever it may be, and judges must reign in juries whose 
collective imaginations go beyond the pale.312 But jurors, many of who are either 
employees or employers, know how the world works and they typically possess the 
requisite common sense and experience to differentiate the trivial employer action from 
the employer action that would dissuade a reasonable employee from complaining about 
corporate fraud.  In most cases, that sort of a determination should be a factual one for the 
jury, not a legal one for the judge.       
 
activity and stated that reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that SOX plaintiff
engaged in protected activity).
311 The SOX statute states that an employer may not “discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass or in
any other manner discriminate against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of
any lawful act done by the employee.” 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (emphasis added). See also 29 C.F.R. §
1980.102(a). Like the Title VII anti-retaliation provision in 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a), the scope of the
adverse employment action part of the SOX statute depends on the interpretation of the term
“discriminate.” The Office of Administrative Law Judges (OALJ) Sarbanes-Oxley Act Whistleblower
Digest already contains several contradictory opinions from administrative law judges concerning the scope
of the SOX adverse employment action element. Halloum v. Intel Corp., 2003-SOX-7, slip. op. at 10 (ALJ
Mar, 4, 2004) adopts a “reasonably likely to deter employees from making a protected disclosure” standard,
advocating a test for unfavorable employment action that encompasses more than simply economic actions.
Hendrix v. American Airlines, 2004-AIR-10, 2004-SOX-23 (ALJ Dec. 9, 2004) similarly applies an
expansive definition of adverse action based on whistleblower law, concluding that placement on a lay-off
list amounts to an adverse employment action even though the person’s name was removed from the list
before the lay-offs came to fruition and thus the person suffered no tangible job consequence. In contrast,
Dolan v. EMC Corporation, 2004-SOX-1, slip. op. at 3 (ALJ Mar. 24, 2004) holds that a SOX adverse
employment action must have some tangible job consequence and unfavorable performance evaluations,
absent tangible job consequences, do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action. The ALJ ruled
in Dolan that the complainant’s negative performance evaluation was not an adverse employment action
because it did not result in a lower salary, jeopardize job security, or cause any tangible job detriment. The
Halloum, Hendrix, and Dolan decisions were decided prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington
Northern and Santa Fe Railroad v. White.
312 See e.g., Justices Wrestle With Appropriate Standard in Argument Regarding Title VII Retaliation,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 74, at AA-1 (April 18, 2006) (Justice Scalia questioned Sheila White’s
attorney, Donald A. Donati, during oral argument in the Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railroad v.
White case about whether a broad standard for adverse employment actions would lead to trivial claims
ending up before a jury and stated that “juries can have amazing imaginations.”); Erickson v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency, ARB No. 03-002, ALJ No. 1999-CAA-2, USDOL/OALJ REPORTER at
25 (ARB May 31, 2006) (co-worker “shunning” that has no tangible job consequences is not an adverse
employment action as a matter of law).
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B. Alternative Approaches   
 The historical test remains ensconced in Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, but, 
over the years, courts and commentators have advocated for various exceptions and 
alternative approaches to the traditional Seventh Amendment analysis.313 The 
complexity exception, the notion that a purely functional approach to Seventh 
Amendment analysis should replace the historical test, and the view that the extent of the 
right to jury trial in civil cases in federal cases is left entirely to the discretion of 
Congress warrant some explanation.314 Treatment of the SOX right to jury trial question 
under these approaches is considered, but the question of whether the stated exception or 
alternative approaches should replace the traditional historical test is beyond the scope of 
this article and will not be dealt with in any comprehensive fashion.  However, a vision of 
the jury as the constitutional actor that can best vindicate the community’s sense of 
justice should influence how we view whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees the 
right to jury trial on SOX claims.    
1. The Complexity Exception and Functional Approach  
 Some commentators argue that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in 
civil cases is severely proscribed in complex cases.315 Although considerable debate 
exists as to what constitutes a complex case316, commentators in favor of a complexity 
exception to the Seventh Amendment have summarized various characteristics of a trial 
that should play a part in considering whether a case is too complex to be heard by a jury.  
They include the operative details and nature of the trial (number of parties, probable 
length of trial, the amount of evidence and corresponding exhibits to be introduced into 
the record), the nature of the evidence to be proposed at trial (the degree to which the 
average juror can realistically understand any sophisticated evidence presented in the 
case), and the difficulty in understanding any complex substantive law relevant to the 
case.317 Of those proponents of a complexity exception, some favor the exception on the 
ground that the English common law and American colonial law took complex cases out 
of the hands of jurors318, others favor the exception on due process grounds319, a few 
 
313 See supra Part III.A.
314 The state-law incorporation approach advocated by Akhil Reed Amar in The Bill of Rights: Creation
and Reconstruction, 89-90 (1998) and examined by Charles Wolfram in The Constitutional History of the
Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 712-18, 732-34 (1973) is another alternative approach that
appears to have some historical support, but also appears to raise numerous practical problems if ever
adopted by the Court. As applied to the SOX action, the right to jury trial in a SOX case under this
approach would depend on the law [with respect to jury trials] of the forum state in which the federal-court
SOX action is brought. No attempt is made to analyze the SOX jury right in each of the 50 states under this
approach.
315 See infra notes 316-320.
316 See Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of Judicial
Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1754-1803 (1992).
317 See Joseph A. Miron, Jr., Note, The Constitutionality of a Complexity Exception to the Seventh
Amendment, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 865, 883-84 (1998); Jeffrey Oakes, The Right to Strike the Jury Trial
Demand in Complex Litigation, 34 U MIAMI L. REV. 243, 290-293 (1980).
318 See Lord Patrick Devlin, Equity, Due Process and the Seventh Amendment: A Commentary on the
Zenith Case, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1571, 1637-38 (1983) and Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at
the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43, 44, 107 (1980); James S. Campbell and
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make arguments based purely on pragmatic reasons.320 Many of these proponents 
interpret Supreme Court cases over the past forty years as opening the door to a 
complexity exception.321 On the other hand, opponents of a complexity exception 
vigorously disagree that history supports a complexity exception322, argue that empirical 
data does not support the view that jurors are incompetent to understand complex legal 
issues323, claim that procedural and judicial management improvements should allay any 
due process concerns324, and posit that jealous preservation of the jury right must be 
maintained because the jury implements important public policies, complexity 
notwithstanding.325
Even if the complexity exception is constitutional, SOX actions do not fit within 
the exception.  In general, the number of parties involved in a SOX action is small 
(typically one plaintiff and one defendant), the length of trial time should be relatively 
short, and the evidence presented should be understandable to jurors if the attorneys 
present the case in a straightforward manner.  Moreover, it would be unwise to say that 
SOX actions are categorically complex merely because they often involve complaints 
 
Nicholas Le Poidevin, Complex Cases and Jury Trials: A Reply to Professor Arnold, 28 U. PA. L. REV.
965, 966 (1980); see also Douglas King, Comment: Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh Amendment
Right to a Jury Trial, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 581, 613 (1984) (complex cases were not possible in English
common law).
319 See Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr., Frank D. Zielinski, and George M. Curtiss, III, A Bicentennial Transition:
Modern Alternatives to Seventh Amendment Jury Trial in Complex Cases, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 61, 90-95,
104 (1988); Oakes, supra note 317, at 298.
320 See Patrick Lynch, The Case for Striking Jury Demands in Complex Antitrust Litigation, 1 REV. LITIG.
3 (1980) (“The jury is as inappropriate to some antitrust cases today as the wild west gunfighter is to
modern Abilene. Judges who insist that the jury is right for all times and all cases make the same mistake
we see portrayed [in television stories involving the magnificent, aging performer who refuses to
acknowledge his or her limitations].”).
321 See Miron, supra note 317, at 886.
322 See Morris S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation,
128 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 830 (1980).
323 See Maxwell M. Blecher and Howard F. Daniels, In Defense of Juries in Complex Antitrust Litigation,
1 REV. LITIG. 47, 74-78 (1980). Empirical studies and scholarly interpretations of those studies are mixed
as to how well jurors fare in complex cases. See Margaret Moses, The Jury-Trial Right in the UCC: On a
Slippery Slope, 54 SMU L. REV. 561, 593-94 (2001) (“With respect to a jury’s handling of technical or
complex issues, a number of studies have concluded that juries handle complex issues well, and that there
is no reason to believe that judges fare better in the face of complexity than jurors.”); Joe S. Cecil, Valerie
P. Hans, and Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil Jury
Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 764 (1991) (“Thus, the overall picture of the jury that emerges from the
available data indicates that juries are capable of deciding even very complex cases, especially if
procedures to enhance jury competence are used.”); Franklin Strier, The Educated Jury: A Proposal for
Complex Litigation, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 49, 55 (1997) (“Several studies buttress the contention of lay jury
incompetence in complex cases.”).
324 See Lisa S. Meyer, Note, Taking the “Complexity” Out of Complex Litigation: Preserving the Right to
Jury Trial, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 337, 360-71 (1993); Steven I. Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility
of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 190, 220 (1990); James L. Flannery, Note, Complex Civil
Litigation: Reconciling the Demands of Due Process with the Right to Trial by Jury, U. PITT. L. REV. 693,
694 (1981); Blecher and Daniels, supra note 323, at 88-91.
325 See Maxwell M. Blecher and Candace E. Carlo, Toward More Effective Handling of Complex Antitrust
Cases, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 727, 744 (1980); Blecher and Daniels, supra note 323, at 78-87.
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about sophisticated securities regulation and accounting practices.  The question is not 
whether SOX actions are complex in the abstract; it is whether the particular issue the 
jury must decide is over its collective head.326
Considerable complexity could arise in determining whether a plaintiff engaged in 
SOX-protected activity.  But, the protected-activity issue, as previously mentioned, 
should be resolved by the judge because it is a question of law on the basis of the fact-law 
distinction.  A SOX jury’s main role as the fact finder is to resolve the issue of causation, 
which it is qualified to do because a SOX causation determination entails making 
probabilistic assessments grounded on real-world experience.  The causation 
determination in a SOX case boils down to determining whether the SOX-protected 
activity was a “motivating factor” or “contributing factor” in the adverse employment 
action.327 The resolution of the causation question in a particular SOX case may be 
difficult because the evidence conflicts, but it is not “complex” in the sense that the issue 
is so technical in nature that it is beyond the comprehension of twelve ordinary citizens.  
This type of causation determination is made by juries in other employment 
discrimination and whistleblower cases all the time.328
Closely related to the complexity exception is the notion that jury trial actions 
should be separated from nonjury trial actions under the Seventh Amendment based on 
the relative abilities of judges and juries.  In Ross v. Bernhard, for example, the Court 
spoke for the first time of the “practical abilities and limitations of juries” as a 
conceivable criterion for constitutionally distinguishing a case that must go to the jury 
under the Seventh Amendment from a case that need not go to the jury.329 Subsequent 
cases revealed that the Court was not prepared to replace the traditional historical test 
with a purely functional approach.330 The Court’s reluctance to adopt an “explicitly 
functional approach to the seventh amendment question” is not surprising given the 
 
326 See Wilkinson, supra note 319, at 84 (“The inquiry [under the complexity exception] is not whether a
case is too complex for a jury because it fits a particular category, like securities regulation or antitrust law,
but whether particular issues in the case are so technical in nature that they are beyond the reasoned and
comprehending decision-making power of the jury.”).
327 See Collins, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1378-80; Halloum v. Intel Corp., ARB No. 04-068, ALJ No. 2003-
SOX-7, USDOL/OALJ REPORTER at 7-8 (ARB Jan. 31, 2006).
328 See Carter v. Diamondback Golf Club, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3739, *23, 97 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1086 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (in mixed-motive religious discrimination case under Title VII,
circumstantial evidence raised a genuine issue of material fact on causation such that the jury must
determine whether illegitimate reasons motivated the employer to terminate the plaintiff’s employment);
EEOC v. International House of Pancakes, 411 F. Supp. 2d 709, 716 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (in age
discrimination case under the ADEA, sufficient evidence existed for a reasonable jury to conclude that
restaurant’s stated reason for ending waitress’s employment relationship was a pretext for age
discrimination); Robinson v. Hilton Hospitality, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11469, *33-*36, 11 Wage &
Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 447 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (in FMLA-retaliation case, genuine issue of material fact raised
on whether employer terminated employee for requesting FMLA leave; causation to be determined by
jury); Former County Employee Wins $4.75 Million in Potential First Verdict under Arizona Law, Daily
Lab. Report (BNA) No. 199, at A-1 (Oct. 17, 2005) (jury returns a multi-million dollar verdict in retaliation
claim under Arizona whistleblower law).
329 Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
330 See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 n.4 (1990);
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 n.4 (1989).
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difficulties inherent with such an approach.  Scholars have pointed out several problems 
with a purely functional approach.331 First, a functional approach has no direct historical 
support.332 Second, disagreement exists concerning the particular functions a jury is best 
able to perform and the types of cases a jury is best suited to hear.333 Third, a functional 
approach would provide federal judges with extraordinary discretion to determine 
whether a jury hears a particular case, which is inconsistent with the Framers’ conception 
of the jury trial right as a strong civilian check on the power of the judge.334
Despite the fact that an explicitly functional approach has not been adopted by the 
Court, the Markman and Del Monte Dunes decisions indicate that the Court, in the 
absence of historical information, is willing to consider the relative abilities and 
limitations of the judge and jury in determining whether, in an action in which the right to 
jury trial attaches, a particular issue within the action should go to the jury.335 In making 
such a determination, the Court has indicated that it will be guided by the jury’s primary 
role as a fact finder.336
For the above-mentioned reasons, it is very unlikely that the Court will delete the 
historical test in favor of a purely functional approach.  If the Court does adopt a purely 
functional approach, which attempts to separate types of cases that must be tried to the 
jury from types of cases that need not be tried to the jury, the SOX whistleblower action 
should be the type of case that is tried to a jury because juries have the requisite skills to 
determine whether an employee was fired for whistleblowing.  Similarly, if the status quo 
remains in force, the Seventh Amendment requires a jury to make factual findings on 
most of the elements of a SOX action.337
2. Congressional Control of Jury Trials on Statutory Claims 
 Various scholars, including Stanton Krauss, Rachael Schwartz, and Kenneth 
Klein, reject the historical test of the Seventh Amendment and conclude that, at least with 
respect to federal laws created by statute, no jury right exists under the Seventh 
Amendment unless Congress specifically provides for a jury right in the statute itself.338
331 See Moses, supra note 183, at 239; Wolfram, supra note 176 at 644.
332 Wolfram, supra note 176, at 718.
333 Id. at 644.
334 Moses, supra note 183, at 239; Wolfram, supra note 176, at 644.
335 See supra note 183.
336 Id.
337 See supra Part III.A.3.
338 See Krauss, supra note 180, at 483 (“In sum, the theory that the Jury Trial Clause gave Congress
plenary authority to determine the extent of the right to civil jury trial in the federal courts comports with
all of the early historical evidence. . . . that theory should be considered the original understanding of the
Seventh Amendment right to jury trial.”); Schwartz, supra note 175, at 629-30 (“The alternative
interpretation places the judgment as to when specific types of civil cases are best tried by juries in the
hands of Congress. This interpretation not only accords with the expressed intentions of the Framers
(demonstrated by contemporary writings), but also provides a far more workable standard for the courts to
apply. . . .”); and Klein, supra note 177, at 1036 (“The Seventh Amendment can be read as the simple
instruction that it is: If a legislature creates, by statute, a legal right which heretofore did not exist, the
legislature can determine whether trial of that right should be to a jury, but in all other instances a litigant
has an absolute right to a jury trial in a civil case in federal court.”).
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In essence, they contend that the Seventh Amendment does no more than state that the 
Constitution does not prohibit jury trials, note that jury trials make sense in some civil 
cases, and specify that Congress has plenary power to decide in which situations a right 
to jury trial should be preserved.339 In an era in which Congress has federalized much of 
what was previously a part of the common law and created new legal rights that would 
have been developed in the past through the common law, the Seventh Amendment’s role 
as a protector of the fundamental importance of the jury in civil cases in federal court will 
be abrogated, if their view is correct.  Thus, such an approach, which would represent a 
paradigm shift in Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, should be scrutinized with the 
utmost care.  If, however, these scholars are correct, there is no right to jury trial in a 
SOX federal-court action because Congress did not specifically provide for a jury right.  
The interpretation of SOX that implies a right to jury trial is unpersuasive if this 
alternative view of the Seventh Amendment ever carries the day.  In that brave new 
world, Congress must specifically provide for a jury trial right in the statute for such a 
right to exist.  It did not do so in the SOX statute.     
3. A Historical Vision of the Jury and its applicability to SOX 
 Scholars have suggested an array of approaches to interpreting and applying the 
Seventh Amendment to civil claims in federal court.340 Each of these approaches has 
various arguments that can be made both for and against.341 Yet, in evaluating whether 
the right to jury trial on a SOX whistleblower action in federal court is constitutionally 
protected, I cannot help but intuitively gravitate to the historical vision of the jury that is 
outlined in current Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.  This vision “focuses on the 
centrality of the institution of the jury in our system of government of the people, by the 
people, and for the people” and acts as “a means by which ordinary people can exercise 
governmental power to vindicate the community’s sense of right.”342 Like Vikram David 
Amar, I wonder if the Sixth Amendment view of the jury should also guide our 
understanding of the Seventh Amendment.343 Might the Framers who meant to ensure 
that a twelve-member jury, not a lone judge, stand as a bulwark against governmental 
tyranny, have also wanted that same institution to judge the whistleblower claims of those 
who stand up to corporate wrongdoing?  If so, we, as twenty-first century Americans, 
might also consider whether any parallels exist between the community interest in having 
a criminal jury determine the guilt or innocence of those Enron executives accused of 
criminal law violations and the community interest in having a civil jury determine 
whether a whistleblower was fired for engaging in SOX-protected activity. To my mind, 
in this era of the “vanishing civil jury trial,” the fundamental importance of the civil jury 
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342 See Vikram David Amar, Implementing an Historical Vision of the Jury in an Age of Administrative
Factfinding and Sentencing Guidelines, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 291, 293 (2005) (“The basic constitutional
vision underlying the Booker/Blakely/Apprendi line of cases focuses on the centrality of the institution of
the jury in our system of government of the people, by the people, and for the people.”).
343 Id. at 297 (“In other words, although the Apprendi line relies on jury rights under the Sixth
Amendment, ought not the vision of the jury it reflects inform our understanding of the Seventh
Amendment, which covers civil juries in federal courts as well?”).
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as a constitutional actor has never been more critical.344 Whether SOX whistleblower 
claims in federal courts are to be tried to juries is something in which all of us, as 
citizens, have a stake.  I would rather see this historical vision of the jury, as opposed to a 
strict convenience and efficiency consideration, influence the constitutional decision.                 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The structure, language, and purpose of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act whistleblower 
provision indicate that courts should imply the right to a jury trial as a matter of statutory 
interpretation.  In addition, the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial 
under the static historical test applied by the Supreme Court because a SOX action is 
analogous to an English common-law action and SOX damages remedies are legal in 
nature.  In general, the jury in a SOX case in federal court should make factual findings 
on the elements of a SOX action, the causation element in particular, and damages.  The 
judge in a SOX case will resolve the other issues in the case, which constitute questions 
of law.     
 
344 See, e.g., Justice Nathan L. Hecht, The Vanishing Civil Jury Trial: Trends in Texas Courts and an
Uncertain Future, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 163 (2005) (documenting the “steady, steep, decades-long decline” in
the number of jury trials in Texas courts).
